Networks, Frictions, and Price Dispersion by Donna, Javier et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Networks, Frictions, and Price Dispersion
Javier Donna and Pablo Schenone and Gregory Veramendi
The Ohio State University, Arizona State University, Arizona State
University
17. July 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67890/
MPRA Paper No. 67890, posted 16. November 2015 14:39 UTC
Networks, Frictions, and Price Dispersion∗
Javier Donna Pablo Schenone Gregory Veramendi
The Ohio State University Arizona State University Arizona State University
First version: January, 2014
This version: November 13, 2015
∗We are grateful to Rune Vejlin for the initial conversations which led to this project. Discussions with
Matt Backus, David Blau, Hector Chade, Eleanor Dillon, Laura Doval, Domenico Ferraro, John Hatfield,
John Kagel, Shachar Kariv, Rasmus Lentz, Dan Levin, Jim Peck, Tiago Pires, Rob Porter, Andrew Rhodes,
Huanxing Yang as well as seminar participants at Arizona State University, Cycles, Adjustment, and Policy
conference (Aarhus University), the Southwest Search and Matching conference (University of California
Riverside), and the 13th International Industrial Organization conference (Boston) have greatly benefited
this work. All errors are unintentional.
Abstract
This paper studies price dispersion in buyer-seller markets using networks to model
frictions, where buyers are linked with a subset of sellers and sellers are linked with a
subset of buyers. Although there is a large search literature studying wage/price dis-
persion, search models typically restrict the type of competition that can occur between
buyers (firms) and sellers (workers) when determining prices or wages. Our approach
allows for indirect competition, where a buyer who is not directly linked with a seller af-
fects the price obtained by that seller. Indirect competition generates the central finding
of our paper: even when there are significant frictions, price distributions and alloca-
tions are close to the perfectly competitive outcome where the law of one price holds.
We then investigate the role of indirect competition in a dynamic setting by studying
wages in the context of an on-the-job search model. We find that indirect competition
has similar effects on wage dispersion and wage dynamics. This leads to two novel pre-
dictions relative to the search literature. Lowering frictions (so that workers receive job
offers at a higher rate) leads to: (1) lower worker mobility and lower expected wage
growth and (2) lower expected wages in markets with high unemployment. We argue
that our framework is suited to the analysis of a wide range of real-world markets, such
as the labor market and buyer-seller trading platforms like eBay or Amazon.
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1 Introduction
Price dispersion is observed in many markets even after accounting for observable charac-
teristics. Examples include labor markets, where similar workers are paid different wages
(Mortensen 2005); buyer-seller trading platforms such as eBay or Amazon, where identical
goods are sold by the same seller at different prices (Einav, Kuchler, Levin, and Sundaresan
2015); and markets for automobiles, where identical automobiles are sold at different prices
by the same dealer (Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso 2001). A common characteristic
of these markets is that buyers interact with multiple, but not all, sellers. In the case of
labor markets, firms interview multiple applicants. Bidders on eBay bid in multiple auctions
for an identical product. Consumers visit multiple automobile dealerships before making a
purchase. A natural question arises: When buyers interact with multiple sellers, how does
this affect price dispersion?
The central insight of this paper is that “indirect competition” plays an important role
in determining price dispersion. For example, consider the case of two eBay auctions where
there is only one common bidder participating in both auctions. The bidders in one auction
indirectly compete with the bidders in the other auction because the two auctions are con-
nected through the common bidder.1 Indirect competition results in an interdependence in
the prices between these two auctions. Even if many sellers are not directly competing for
the same buyer, indirect competition can equalize prices across them. How buyers and sellers
are connected (linked) determines the extent of the indirect competition. To the best of our
knowledge, there has been no attempt to study price dispersion in the presence of indirect
competition. See Section 2 for a detailed literature review.
In this paper, we use networks to model buyer-seller markets where a buyer can obtain a
good from the seller only if the two are linked. Perfect competition is the special case where
all buyers are linked to all sellers in the network, leading to the Walrasian outcome. Frictions
are present in the market whenever there is at least one seller that is not linked to every
buyer. Hence, the level of frictions in the network is determined by the total number of links
(or sparsity) of the network.
The central finding of our paper is that even relatively sparse networks lead to price
distributions and allocations that are close to the perfectly competitive outcome.2 Our
analysis has a theoretical and a quantitative component. First, an application of proposition 1
shows that many links in any given network can be redundant (i.e. have no effect on prices
and allocations).3 In particular, many links in a perfectly competitive market are redundant.
This leads to the following question: How many links can be removed and still obtain prices
1See section 3 for an example with buyers and sellers.
2Our finding that pricing behavior in networks with frictions closely resembles the perfectly compet-
itive outcome is consistent with the pricing behavior observed in the laboratory experiments in Charness,
Corominas-Bosch, and Fréchette (2007) and Gale and Kariv (2009). See Judd and Kearns (2008) for a survey
of experiments in networked markets.
3See section 3 for examples of redundant links that have no effect on the prices and allocations in a market.
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and allocations that are close to the perfectly competitive outcome? We perform a numerical
analysis to quantify this effect. For example, in a network of 10,000 sellers with homogeneous
goods, over 99% of the sellers are paid the same price when less than 0.1% of the possible
links are active. The prediction that even sparse networks lead to price profiles that are
close to the perfectly competitive outcome is a consequence of indirect competition. As the
number of links increases, indirect competition among buyers rapidly becomes more likely.
Indirect competition causes buyers and sellers to behave “as if” there were links between
them, making a direct link redundant. Indirect competition makes markets with frictions
look like they were perfectly competitive, hence the result.
We then investigate the role of indirect competition in a dynamic setting by studying
wages in an on-the-job search model.4 As in the buyer-seller model, indirect competition
pushes wages and wage dynamics toward the Walrasian outcome even when frictions are
present (i.e. even in sparse networks). This leads to two novel predictions about wage
dynamics relative to the search literature. First, reducing frictions (increasing the job offer
rate) leads to lower expected wages in loose markets (i.e. when there are more unemployed
workers than open vacancies at firms). This is because in the Walrasian outcome, the less
numerous side of the market captures all of the surplus. Second, increasing the job offer rate
leads to lower wage growth and mobility. Again, in the Walrasian outcome, workers and
firms immediately find their best match and so there is no wage growth or mobility. Our
model predicts that due to indirect competition workers do not always benefit from reducing
frictions. Workers in tight markets will benefit, while workers in loose markets will have
lower wages. These predictions give us new insights into the impact of technologies (e.g. the
internet) and policies (e.g. job search assistance programs) that reduce frictions.
In summary, our main contribution is to show the effect of indirect competition on price
dispersion. We develop a model using networks where we characterize the set of prices that
sustain any pairwise stable matching in an unrestricted network. Although the theory gives
us economic intuition for indirect competition, it is uninformative about whether indirect
competition is quantitively relevant. To quantify this effect, we simulate a large number
of random networks. From a practical standpoint, numerical analysis is necessary for this
problem because solving random networks analytically is intractable for all, but the simplest
networks.5 To perform the numerical analysis, we develop a deferred acceptance algorithm for
finding pairwise-stable matches and the full set of prices that supports them. Using pairwise
stability as our matchmaking criterion implies that the equilibrium of any game that is
consistent with Pareto efficiency will be included in our set of matchings. Our simulations
4Search models can be mapped into the corresponding network using the same firms and workers where
each worker receives a link from a firm when they receive a job offer from that firm in the search model.
Many search models are in continuous time. Hence, decreasing frictions in these models increases the offer
arrival rates to workers. Yet, since these models are in continuous time, at any instant they only receive one
offer.
5We are not the first to rely on numerical methods for analyzing random networks. See the discussion in
Jackson (2008, Chapter 4, Section 2).
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show that indirect competition can lead to price distributions that are almost degenerate
(i.e. very little price dispersion). In the labor market application, we predict that reducing
frictions leads to lower expected wages in loose markets, and that increasing the job offer
rate leads to lower wage growth and mobility.
Outline of the Paper
The theoretical analysis begins by studying arbitrary buyer-seller networks. These networks
are exogenously formed by linking buyers and sellers, but no restrictions are placed on how
many sellers a buyer can be linked with. Sellers offer one unit of an indivisible good. Buyers
have single unit demand and also differ in their valuation of the good. To keep the model
simple, we focus on the homogeneous goods case, where all sellers have the same valuation
for the good. Buyers’ utility is their valuation less the price if they obtain the good and zero
otherwise. Sellers’ utility is the price they receive if they sell the good and their valuation
otherwise.
In the model, we assume matches form according to pairwise stability restricted to the
network. That is, a buyer obtains a good from a seller at a price p if four conditions hold:
first, the buyer and the seller are connected in the network; second, there is no other seller
linked to this buyer that is willing to sell at a price lower than p; third, there is no other
buyer linked to the seller that is willing to pay a price higher than p; finally, the price p lies
between the seller’s valuation and the buyer’s valuation. This is the weakest criterion for
matchmaking that is consistent with Pareto efficiency.
The main proposition characterizes the set of all pairwise stable matchings in an arbitrary
network and the set of prices that sustain them. To do that we decompose the original network
into a network of fully connected subnetworks. With this, we identify two components
that jointly determine the prices that sustain pairwise stable matchings: a pure competitive
component and an outside option component. Fully connected subnetworks are competitive
markets with a unique price. The links between these subnetworks introduce an outside
option component because a buyer from one subnetwork might choose to participate in
another. The final prices that sustain a stable matching is the result of these two effects.
We use our characterization of the prices that support pairwise stable matchings to de-
sign an algorithm that can simulate large markets. For any given pairwise stable matching,
calculating the set of prices that sustain it is simple whenever the network is small (e.g. 2
sellers and 3 buyers). However, since the applications of interest (the labor market, inter-
net auctions) involve large economies, calculating the set of sustaining prices is intractable.
Hence, we design an deferred acceptance algorithm that outputs a matching (i.e a complete
specification of buyer-seller matches) that is pairwise stable, and the set of prices that sustain
it.
The algorithm we use to simulate the model is a deferred acceptance algorithm that works
in two stages. In the first stage, one side of the market (e.g. sellers) hold “auctions” and the
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other side (e.g. buyers) sequentially “bid” in their linked auctions. Once no bidder wants
to make any new bids, the algorithm ends. A corollary of the main proposition is that the
outcome of the algorithm is indeed a stable matching. The second stage finds the lower and
upper bounds of the set of prices that support the pairwise-stable matching from the first
stage.6
We simulate a range of networks to obtain predictions about price distributions. We start
with a set of heterogeneous buyers and homogeneous sellers. We parameterize the level of
frictions by choosing the number of links per buyer in the network. This determines the
total number of links in the network. The simulation then randomly draws links between
sellers and buyers. After the network is realized, we run the algorithm and generate a price
profile. Given that our algorithm can be applied to arbitrary network structures and it is
computationally tractable for both small and large markets, our methodology is applicable to
many empirical settings such as labor markets, online buyer-seller platforms, and automobile
markets, among others.
We adapt the buyer-seller model to the labor market to explore questions about wage
dispersion and growth. In this case, workers are sellers and firms are buyers of their services.
To study wage growth, we extend our model to accommodate multiple periods. In this
extension each period has three stages. In the first stage, J new firms enter the market and
links are formed with the employed and unemployed workers. The parameters J and the
number of links determine the market tightness (ratio of J to unemployed workers, denoted
by θ) and the level of frictions. Firms that are employing a worker from a previous period
do not receive any new links but retain the link to their employee. In the second stage,
firm-worker matches are formed given the new network as in the basic buyer-seller model.
Applying the buyer-seller model implies that workers accept the vacancy that pays the highest
wage. Hence, workers do not consider other aspects of the match, such as future wage growth
(see section 4.4 for more on this point). Finally, at the end of the period, some matches are
randomly destroyed. The firms that are unmatched at the end of a period (either because
the match was destroyed or they could not form a match in the first place) exit the market.
We interpret “firms” as time sensitive vacancies so that, if by the end of a period, a vacancy
is not filled, it disappears from the job market. When the next period starts, J new firms
enter.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we describe the related
literature and highlight how our paper contributes to the current body of work. In Section 3,
we present two motivating examples. In Section 4 we describe the model. Section 5 presents
the deferred acceptance algorithm. In Section 6 we describe the results of the simulation.
Finally, in Section 7, we discuss how our results can be interpreted in the context of eBay
auctions and labor markets, and how they can be used to develop a framework for robust
6Prices that support a matching are a function, mapping each matched pair into a real number. When
we say “maximum” and “minimum” one should understand this in the pointwise order of functions.
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econometric analysis. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 Contributions and Related Literature
Primary Literature
There is a vast literature in industrial organization (IO) and labor studying price and wage
determination, and the allocation of goods and services in markets.7 Models can be catego-
rized based on how prices are determined: (1) prices are determined ex ante by the seller
before meeting buyers (e.g. wage-posting models in the labor literature and price-setting
firms in the IO literature) or (2) prices are determined ex post after the seller meets the
buyers (e.g. wage-bargaining models in the labor literature and auction models in the IO
literature).8 However, none of these works have addressed how prices are determined in the
presence of frictions and indirect competition. This is due to modeling assumptions that
exclude one, or both, of the following features: (1) both buyers (firms) and sellers (workers)
receive multiple links, and (2) prices are determined ex post after buyers and sellers (workers
and firms) meet. Models that omit (1) restrict the network so that indirect competition
cannot occur and models that omit (2) do not allow for indirect competition since agents
cannot compete on prices after the network has been formed.
The main contribution of this paper is that indirect competition has significant conse-
quences on the predictions of price dispersion, wage inequality, and wage growth (see Section
6 for details). From a normative perspective, ignoring indirect competition could lead to
ill-informed policy decisions on fundamental issues such as the analysis of mergers, consumer
welfare, minimum wage, and unemployment assistance programs.9 In this paper we fill this
gap by providing: (1) a simple model to study the determination of prices that allows for
indirect competition; (2) a proposition that shows that many links in a network can be
redundant (due to indirect competition) and, therefore, a fully connected network is not nec-
essary to obtain the Walrasian outcome; and (3) a simulation of the model that quantifies
the importance of indirect competition in large buyer-seller and labor markets.
There is an extensive literature in IO that uses models of search to rationalize price
dispersion observed in real world markets.10 Some of these models include fixed sample
and sequential search, whereby firms post prices and consumers search for the best price
7See Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006), Bajari and Hortacsu (2004), Hasker and Sickles (2010); and
Alan (2011), Lentz and Mortensen (2010), Eckstein and Van den Berg (2007), Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright
(2005) for detailed surveys in the industrial organization and labor literature, respectively.
8We follow Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) in categorizing search-theoretical models in this way.
9For example, in Section 6 we show that job search assistance can lead to lower expected wages in labor
markets, in contrast with most search models. For antitrust purposes indirect competition may change
the relevant definition of a market when, for example, one firm participates in two markets that appear
to be separate (see Cooper 1989 for an early investigation of indirect competition with spatial product
differentiation).
10IO search models can be mapped into the corresponding network using the same firms and consumers
where a consumer receives a link from a firm when the consumer searches for a price quote of the firm.
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by incurring a cost each time they obtain an additional price quote (e.g. Stigler 1961;
Rothschild 1973; Reinganum 1979; MacMinn 1980; Burdett and Judd 1983; Carlson and
McAfee 1983; Stahl 1989; Janssen and Moraga-González 2004; Janssen, Moraga-Gonzalez,
and Wildenbeest 2005; Arbatskaya 2007; Lester 2011) and clearinghouse models, whereby an
informational clearinghouse provides consumers with a list of prices and consumers buy at
the lowest price listed (e.g. Salop and Stiglitz 1977; Rosenthal 1980; Varian 1980; Baye and
Morgan 2001; Baye, Morgan, and Scholten 2004).11 In IO models, price dispersion typically
arises as an equilibrium outcome of the behavior of firms and consumers (e.g. as a way to
price discriminate among consumers with different search costs). In these models there is
ex ante competition among firms for consumers, but there is no ex post competition among
firms for consumers (because prices are posted), thus restricting indirect competition. In
the competitive auctions literature, either buyers are allowed to bid in only one auction
(e.g. McAfee 1993; Wolinsky 1988; Julien, Kennes, and King 2000) or there are no frictions
(e.g. Peters and Severinov 1997, 2006). Restricting buyers to bid in only one auction restricts
indirect competition in the market. By allowing buyers to be linked to many sellers, our model
generates competition among sellers absent in competitive auctions models with frictions.12
There is a large literature in labor that uses on-the-job search models to understand
wage dispersion in labor markets (see e.g. Mortensen 2005 and Postel-Vinay and Robin
2002). In wage posting and competitive search models (e.g. Burdett and Mortensen 1998
and Moen 1997), there is ex ante competition among firms for workers. Firms must post
and commit to wages before coming into contact with workers. Models of directed search
with multiple applications (e.g. Kranton and Minehart 2001; Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman
2006; Kircher 2009; Galenianos and Kircher 2009; Walthoff 2012; Albrecht, Gautier, and
Vroman 2014) are related to our model in that workers can apply for multiple jobs in a
period. In these models, firms also post wages, but workers can apply to more than one
vacancy. Since firms post wages, workers are not able to negotiate wages ex post between
different firms, disallowing indirect competition. A central question analyzed in this literature
is whether the level of entry is efficient. Although an important question, the efficiency of
the entry decision is not the focus in our paper. In Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2014),
workers post selling mechanisms and firms choose one worker to interact with, thus ruling
out indirect competition. Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2014) allows for wage competition
between firms but not between workers. Models with Bertrand competition between firms
(e.g. Postel-Vinay and Robin 2002) have recently become popular in the empirical labor
11We follow Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006) in categorizing IO search models in this way.
12One way to interpret our model is in terms of a competing auctions environment similar to Peters and
Severinov (2006), but where buyers are linked with a subset of the sellers (i.e. when there are market
frictions). The environment of Peters and Severinov (2006) is frictionless in the sense that any buyer may
participate in any auction. The bidding rule proposed by Peters and Severinov (2006) for their frictionless
competing auctions environment is not a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium when frictions are present (Donna,
Schenone, and Veramendi 2015).
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search literature and are also closest to our model.13 On one hand, these models have ex post
competition between firms by allowing a firm to make counter-offers when their employees
come into contact with rival firms. On the other hand, there is no ex post competition
between workers. In contrast to the labor literature, we allow both firms and workers to
compete ex post on wages, which is necessary to generate indirect competition.
Other Related Literature
Since we model markets of buyers and sellers, our paper relates to other fields such as network
theory, matching, financial networks, and computer science. Here we briefly relate our paper
to these other fields.
Although there are papers in the network theory literature that analyze static models
where multiple buyers negotiate with multiple sellers, none of them study price dispersion.14
Fainmesser and Galeotti (2015) develop a framework for studying optimal pricing of a mo-
nopolist in the presence of indirect competition. Kranton and Minehart (2001), Gautier
and Holzner (2013), and Elliott (2014) study efficiency of these markets.15 Corominas-Bosch
(2004) examines the equilibrium payoffs of an alternating offers game to answer two ques-
tions: what is the set of networks that supports a specific allocation (similar to what we call
the “Walrasian outcome”), and what are the networks that only support this allocation.16
Manea (2011) investigates bilateral bargaining in networks. Polanski and Vega-Redondo
13See e.g. Bagger, Fontaine, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2014).
14There is a vast literature in economics and sociology that studies information transmission in social
networks (for example, see Myers and Shultz 1951; Rees 1966; Montgomery 1991; Calvó-Armengol and
Jackson 2004, 2007; and the references there). Pairwise stability has been used to study network formation
(e.g. Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). We do not study information transmission nor network formation. In
contrast, we use pairwise stability as the matchmaking criterion in a network with frictions. We characterize
pairwise stable allocations and the set of prices that sustain them in networked markets. We then use this
characterization to study price dispersion in these networks. See Jackson (2008) for a detailed review of the
literature on social and economic networks.
15Kranton and Minehart (2001) study efficiency when using a public ascending auction to clear the market.
They do this in two steps: first, for each exogenously given network, they study conditions under which
the equilibrium outcome is efficient; second, they study endogenous network formation and prove that the
endogenously formed networks satisfy their conditions for efficiency. Gautier and Holzner (2013) study
efficient allocations in arbitrary bipartite graphs by studying the set of maximal matchings. Elliott (2014)
studies the efficiency of the entry decisions of firms and workers in a labor market model. Elliott (2014) shows
that, for his particular labor market game, there exists a perfect Bayes Nash equilibrium (PBNE) where the
payoffs in a sparse network are the same as the payoffs in the perfectly competitive outcome. In contrast,
our results are game-free: the only constraint we impose on allocations is that they be pairwise stable. So we
remain agnostic about the mechanism (game) that generates such allocations. By implication, we are also free
of equilibrium assumptions (Nash Equilibrium, PBNE, rationalizability, etc.). The results are complementary
since our model does not nest his and vice-versa. Workers in his model choose which firms to apply to, while
workers in our model receive links exogenously. Our assumption is similar to the assumption made in the
random search literature, where workers and firms meet randomly; Elliott’s assumption is similar to the
assumption made in the directed search literature, where workers choose which firms to meet (see Rogerson,
Shimer, and Wright 2005 for more on modeling decisions in search models). We have workers and firms meet
exogenously since our goal is not to develop a theory of labor market participation, but a parsimonious model
of wage dispersion.
16A comparison between our “abstractions” and Corominas-Bosch’s decomposition construction can be
found in Section C of the online appendix.
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(2013) study efficiency in a pairwise stable trading network where buyers and sellers meet in
pairs at every point in time and bargain over their bilateral surplus. Elliott (2015) extends
the Kranton and Mineheart model to consider different levels of bargaining power, different
cost shares, negotiated investments, and ex ante heterogeneous gains from trade.
Moreover, the network literature typically proposes a concrete game to be played within
these networks and focuses under which conditions (if any) the equilibria of these games are
Pareto efficient.17 However, to an econometrician, the concrete mechanism through which
the goods are allocated is rarely observable. Hence, it is useful to impose a minimal set of
restrictions on this allocation mechanism. Remaining agnostic with respect to the details of
the game allows the researcher to weaken the behavioral assumptions that would be specific
to the game otherwise imposed; for example, whether buyers are submitting simultaneous (or
sequential) bids to sellers, whether sellers are proposing simultaneous (or sequential) prices
to the buyers, whether they are alternating bids and price propositions, etc. The weakest
criterion for matchmaking that is consistent with Pareto efficiency and agnostic regarding
the game details is pairwise stability. For this reason, we focus on pairwise-stable matchings
and characterize the prices that sustain them.
Our paper is related to the literature on the matching role of markets (e.g. Gale and
Shapley 1962; Shapley and Shubik 1972; Shapley and Scarf 1974; Crawford and Knoer 1981;
Kelso and Crawford 1982; Ausubel and Milgrom 2002; Hatfield and Milgrom (2005); and Hat-
field and Kojima 2008, 2010).18 We follow the matching literature by developing a deferred-
acceptance algorithm that picks specific stable matchings. The algorithm has two stages. The
first stage outputs an allocation and is motivated by the wage adjusting process in Craw-
ford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford (1982). This allocation has the property
that there exist prices for which it is pairwise stable. The second stage outputs two prices:
the pointwise minimum price at which the stage 1 allocation is stable, and the pointwise
maximum price at which the stage 1 allocation is stable.19
There is also a growing literature that uses networks to study trading in financial settings
such as over-the-counter (OTC) markets (e.g. Gofman 2011; Malamud and Rostek 2013;
Babus and Kondor 2013; and Alvarez and Barlevy 2014). They use concrete games to
investigate OTC markets where dealers trade with other dealers. In contrast, we study
markets where the set of sellers and buyers belong to two disjoint sets: sellers can only trade
with buyers while buyers can only trade with sellers (i.e. bipartite networks as defined in
Section 4).
In the computer science literature, Kakade, Kearns, and Ortiz (2004) study trade using
an Arrow-Debreu economy (without firms) where consumers trade goods with other con-
17Elliott (2015) is the only paper we are aware of that uses pairwise stability as the matchmaking criterion
in a network with frictions, but he does not investigate price dispersion.
18Roth (2008) discusses recent progress in the study of deferred-acceptance algorithms. See Roth and
Sotomayor (1990) for a comprehensive survey of the two-sided matching literature.
19See section 5 for details.
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sumers. Kakade, Kearns, Ortiz, Pemantle, and Suri (2004) use a concrete game to study
the interaction between the statistical structure of the underlying network and the variation
in prices at equilibrium.20 Our model also relates to the classical assignment problem. The
goal of this literature is to develop efficient algorithms (e.g. Hungarian algorithm, auction
algorithms, simplex algorithms, etc.) to maximize total output in a setup similar to ours
(i.e. obtain the Pareto efficient matching). The first stage of our algorithm is similar to the
auction algorithm which is known to perform well with sparse matrices (see Bertsekas 1992
for a survey). The goal of the algorithms literature is to find one allocation and possibly one
price per match that maximizes output. In contrast, our goal is to find the set of prices that
support pairwise stable allocations and study the relationship between frictions and price
dispersion.
3 Two Motivating Examples
The following two examples illustrate indirect competition and the usefulness of our theoreti-
cal tool for characterizing pairwise stable matches in networks. In both examples, we assume
that sellers sell identical goods.
We use Example 1 to get intuition about indirect competition. Indirect competition is a
feature of the structure of the network, whereby buyers that are not connected to the same
seller compete with each other. Likewise, indirect competition between sellers occurs when
sellers that are not connected to the same buyer compete with each other. The simplest
example that includes this feature involves two sellers and three buyers.
Example 1. Assume that buyers A, B and C are ordered in their valuations
(µ(A) > µ(B) > µ(C) > 0) and sellers 1 and 2 have the same valuation (normal-
ized to 0). Consider the following network, where thick lines indicate the pairwise
stable matches:
1
2
A
B
C
Buyers
Sellers
20Kakade, Kearns, Ortiz, Pemantle, and Suri (2004) analyze networked markets where the numbers of
buyers and sellers are equal. They show that, for their particular game, there is no equilibrium price dispersion
when the following conditions hold: (1) the number of buyers and sellers go to infinity, (2) the links are formed
uniformly at random, and (3) the probability of forming a link is high enough. In their model there is limiting
price dispersion (as the number of buyers and sellers go to infinity) when the network is formed via preferential
attachment. In contrast, the only constraint we impose on allocations is that they be pairwise stable. So our
results are game-free. In addition, in our simulations we study price dispersion in bipartite networks varying
arbitrarily the number of buyers, the number of sellers, and the number of links per seller or buyer.
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The buyer-preferred stable match is for buyer A to pay µ(C) to seller 1 and buyer
B to pay µ(C) to seller 2. Buyer B cannot pay less than µ(C) because buyer C
will poach seller 2. Likewise, buyer A cannot pay less than µ(C) because buyer B
will poach seller 1. In this example, buyer A is indirectly competing with buyer
C. Indirect competition forces buyer A to pay µ(C) even though buyer C is not
linked to seller 1. For this reason, adding a link between buyer C and seller 1
is redundant (i.e. does not affect prices or allocations). To further highlight the
role of indirect competition, notice that if buyer C dropped out of the market,
then both buyer A and buyer B paying zero is the buyer-preferred pairwise stable
match.
Example 2 demonstrates how we use a network decomposition (which we call abstractions)
to highlight the importance of indirect competition and characterize the prices that sustain
pairwise stable matches. An abstraction in fully connected networks is a decomposition of
a network into fully connected subnetworks that satisfy the following properties: (1) each
node in the abstraction is a subnetwork of the original network, (2) each link in the original
network is either a link within a subnetwork in the abstraction or a link that connects two
distinct nodes in the abstraction. This construction uses that fully connected subnetworks
are competitive markets with no price dispersion. The following example demonstrates one
possible abstraction of a network.
Example 2. Consider a market with three sellers and four buyers. Assume buyers
and sellers are connected as in the network below. Assume that the buyers are
ordered in their valuations (µ(A) > µ(B) > µ(C) > µ(D) > b) and the sellers
have the same valuation (i.e. b(1) = b(2) = b(3) = b). Thick lines indicate a
pairwise stable matching.
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Network Fully Connected Subnetworks
1
2
3
A
B
C
D
BuyersSellers
1
2
3
A
B
C
D
G
G′
G′′
Even though many prices sustain it, there is an essentially unique pairwise
stable match: Buyer A buys from seller 1, buyer B buys from seller 2, and buyer
C buys from seller 3.21
Abstractions are useful to highlight how indirect competition affects price formation.22 We
proceed with 3 observations. (1) Consider subnetwork G′ as an independent subnetwork. In
this case, a pairwise stable matching corresponds to a perfectly competitive allocation: both
B and C buy a good from sellers 2 and 3, and pay a price between b and µ(C). (2) However,
21Nothing changes if buyers B and C are switched, so that B buys from 3 and C buys from 2.
22 One way to construct an abstraction is to follow four steps: (1) Form a subnetwork around each stable
match, (2) combine subnetworks that are fully-connected, (3) form a separate subnetwork for each unmatched
buyer (seller), and (4) form a directed link between subnetworks if there is a buyer in one subnetwork that
is connected to a seller in another subnetwork. The direction of the link will point from the subnetwork
that contains the buyer to the subnetwork that contains the seller. Although there may not be a unique
assignment in step 2, any assignment will characterize the same set of pairwise stable matches and their
supporting prices.
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
1
2
3
A
B
C
G
G′
G′′′
1
2
3
A
C
B
G
G′
1
2
3
A
C
B
D
G
G′
G′′
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subnetwork G′ is not an independent subnetwork. Since buyer D is linked to seller 2, then
sellers C and B must pay at least µ(D). (3) Similarly, in subnetwork G buyer A will have to
pay a price between the price in subnetwork G′, and µ(A). Note that, even though A is not
linked to D, indirect competition makes it such that A must pay a price larger than µ(D).
More generally, the direction of the link between subnetwork G′ and subnetwork G describes
the relationship of the prices that prevails in each subnetwork, namely p(G′) ≤ p(G).
We call this an abstraction because the identity of the buyer in subnetwork G′ linked
to the seller in subnetwork G is irrelevant; similarly, the identity of the seller to which D
is connected is irrelevant. Abstractions also help clarify which links are redundant. For
example, the link between buyer C and seller 1 establishes a link between G′ and G, so the
link between buyer B and seller 1 is redundant. Similarly, the link between buyer B and seller
1 establishes a link between G′ and G, so the link between buyer C and seller 1 is redundant.
The important point is that only one of these links is needed, but which one in particular
is not relevant. Likewise a link between buyer D and seller 1 is redundant, because there is
already a directed link from G′′ to G′ to G. In other words, buyer D is indirectly competing
with buyer A through the links: D – 2 – B – 1 – A. In this way, abstractions facilitate our
understanding of the competition in the network. What is relevant is the existance of the
links between subgraphs, but not the specific identity nor the number of buyers and sellers
that generate those links.
4 The Model
4.1 Buyer-Seller Model
We consider buyers and sellers that wish to match pairwise. Sellers differ in their valuation
and offer a homogeneous good. For simplicity, we assume that sellers have no idiosyncratic
preferences over the buyer they sell to. Buyers differ in their valuation and have single unit
demand. A buyer with valuation µ that buys from a seller at price p has utility µ− p and 0
otherwise. The sellers’ utility is the price, p, if they sell the good, and their valuation, b, if
they do not. Single unit demand implies we focus on pairwise matching.
Matching takes place in exogenous buyer-seller networks. Each buyer is linked with a
subset of sellers. That a buyer is not (necessarily) linked to all possible sellers captures
search frictions in the environment.
The formal model we use to capture these interactions is a graph-theoretic model. A
graph is a set of nodes connected by links (or edges). We say the graph is undirected if the
direction of the link does not matter. Otherwise, we say the graph is directed. We say that
the graph is bipartite if the set of nodes can be partitioned into two sets such that no two
nodes in the same set are connected to each other. In our framework, buyers and sellers
constitute a bipartite undirected graph: first, the set of nodes is partitioned into buyers and
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sellers; second, a buyer is linked to a seller if and only if that seller is linked to that buyer;
and third, no buyer (respectively seller) is connected to another buyer (respectively seller).
For ease of exposition, we leave formal definitions for appendix A.
Since graphs tell us which buyers are connected to which sellers, but they do not tell us
the valuation of buyers nor the valuation of the sellers, we extend the definition of the graph
to the definition of a network. Intuitively, a network is a graph where each node is given a
numerical value. This value is interpreted as the “valuation” of the buyer or seller. For the
rest of the paper, even if not explicitly mentioned, J denotes the set of buyers, and j indexes
buyers. Similarly, I denotes the set of sellers, and i indexes sellers.
Given a network, a matching (typically denoted M) is any subset of the set of links such
that three properties hold: first, each buyer is matched to at most one seller (recall that
buyers have unit demand); second, each seller is matched to at most one buyer; and finally,
if a seller is matched to a buyer then the buyer is matched to the seller. When a seller-buyer
pair (i, j) is in matching M , we say that i and j are matched. Moreover, given a matching
M , we define i∗ : J → I ∪{∅} as the function that maps each buyer to the seller with whom
it is matched, or to the symbol ∅ if the buyer is unmatched. Likewise, j∗ : I → J ∪ {∅} is
the function that maps each seller to the buyer with whom it is matched, or to the symbol
∅ if the seller is unmatched. Moreover, given a set of links (say, E), a function that maps
these links into real numbers (denoted pE) is called a price function. This real number is
interpreted as the price that would prevail if the buyer was to buy the good from the seller.
The price function is individually rational if, for each buyer-seller edge, it specifies a price
that lies between the seller’s valuation and the buyer’s valuation. Finally, given a matching
M and a price function pM , the function v summarizes the virtual price each agent (buyer
or seller) pays or is getting payed, without having to explicitly distinguish if the they are
matched or not. We call these functions v the payment functions. In symbols: for each j and
i,
v(j) =
{
µ(j) if i∗(j) = ∅
pM(i
∗(j), j) if i∗(j) 6= ∅,
and
v(i) =
{
b(i) if j∗(i) = ∅
pM(i, j
∗(i)) if j∗(i) 6= ∅.
Next, we define pairwise stability of a matching M with respect to a price function p.
Pairwise stability means that the edges inM are priced such that individual rationality holds,
and there are no mutually benefit matches by agents that are linked but are not matched
(i.e. agents linked by an edge e ∈ E \ M ). In other words, any extension of pM to all
edges cannot yield Pareto improvements over the match M executed at prices pM . Note
that pairwise stability only requires that an agent is able to observe the prices of his linked
counterparts, but not who they are linked to.
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Definition (block). Let M be a matching and p be a price function. Suppose a seller i
is linked to a worker j, but i is not matched to j. We say the pair (i, j) blocks (M, pM) if
v(i) < v(j).
Definition (pairwise stability). Given a network N and a matching M , we say M is
pairwise stable in N at prices pM if the following hold:
• No blocking: no seller-buyer pair (i, j) blocks (M, pM),
• Individual rationality: for all seller-buyer pairs (i, j) that are matched, pM(i, j) ∈
[b(i), µ(j)].
When the identity of the network is clear, we simply say M is stable at prices pM (omitting
“in N ”).
In fully connected networks it is simple to characterize stable matchings. Indeed, if M
is stable at prices pM , then all prices must be the same. To see this, assume i is matched
to j, i′ is matched to j′, and let p be any individually rational price function defined over
all seller-buyer pairs. Then, p(j, i) ≤ p(j, i′) ≤ p(j′, i′) ≤ p(j′, i) ≤ p(j, i), where all these
terms are well defined because the network is fully connected. As a corollary, all stable
matchings can be characterized by whether there are more buyers than sellers or vice versa.
Intuitively, stable matchings are those matchings which are maximal and can be sustained
by individually rational prices that price out the side of the market (sellers or buyers) that is
in excess. In this regard, the matchings and prices we obtain from pairwise stability in fully
connected networks are those that would prevail if this was a perfectly competitive economy.
We summarize this in the following remark.
Remark 1. Let (J , I, E;µ, b) be a fully connected network, where E is the set of edges. Let
J = #J , I = #I. Assume that b = max{b(i) : i ∈ I} ≤ min{µ(j) : j ∈ J } = µ. Let
M ⊂ E be a matching.
• If I > J , M is stable if, and only if,
– All buyers are matched: For each j ∈ J there is i ∈ I such that (j, i) ∈M .
– Only lowest valuation sellers are matched: If i ∈ I is such that #{i′ : b(i) >
b(i′)} ≥ J then there is no j ∈ J such that (j, i) ∈M .
– Seller valuations determine matching prices: For each (j, i) ∈ E, p(j, i) = p where
p ∈ [max{b(i) : (∃j ∈ J ) such that (j, i) ∈M}, {min{b(i) : (@j ∈ J ) such that (j, i) ∈
M}].
• If I = J , M is stable if, and only if,
– All buyers are matched: For each j ∈ J there is i ∈ I such that (j, i) ∈M .
– All sellers are matched: For each i ∈ I there is j ∈ J such that (j, i) ∈M .
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– Sellers sell at an intermediate price: For each (j, i) ∈ E, p(j, i) = p where p ∈
[b, µ].
• If I < J , M is stable if, and only if,
– Only highest valuation buyers are matched: For each j ∈ J if {j′ : µ(j′) > µ(j)} ≥
I then there is no i ∈ I such that (j, i) ∈M .
– All sellers are matched: For each i ∈ I there is j ∈ J such that (j, i) ∈M .
– Buyer valuations determine matching prices: For each (j, i) ∈ E, p(j, i) = p where
p ∈ [max{µ(j) : (@i ∈ I) such that (j, i) ∈M},min{µ(j) : (∃i ∈ I) such that (j, i) ∈
M}].
4.2 Two Propositions
In this section we present two propositions which we use to understand how indirect com-
petition affects the degree of price dispersion in the market. Given a buyer-seller network
and a stable matching in such network, Proposition 1 states that only a subset of links is
relevant for determining the prices that sustain that matching. To identify this set of links,
we define the abstraction of a network. As the name suggests, this is a construction that
abstracts away from links that are irrelevant for determining the prices that sustain a given
stable matching. Although useful for understanding which links are relevant in a network, it
does not fully characterize the set of prices that support a pairwise stable matching. We then
define maximal abstractions and use them to characterise the full set of prices that support
any given pairwise stable match. The characterization is provided in Proposition 2.
We start by defining the abstraction of a network. Slightly abusing notation (see remark
5 in appendix A) an abstraction of a network is a directed graph with nodes and edges as
follows: each node is a subnetwork of the original network, and each edge in the original
network is either (i) an edge within a subnetwork in the abstraction or (ii) connecting two
distinct nodes in the abstraction. We now present a formal definition for the abstraction of
a network.
Definition (abstraction). Let N be a buyer-seller network. From N construct a directed
graph, H, as follows:
• Each node in H is associated with a fully-connected subnetwork of N . These subnet-
works should be disjoint, in the sense that if a seller (or buyer) belongs to a subnetwork
associated to a node in H, it cannot belong to a subnetwork associated with another
node.
• A node h in H is linked to a node h′ in H if the subnetwork associated to h contains a
buyer that, in N , is linked to a seller that belong to the subnetwork associated with h′.
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Remark 2. Since a graph that consists of a single node is fully connected, an abstraction in
fully connected networks always exists.
Remark 3. Abstractions in fully connected networks will not necessarily be unique.
Remark 4. Consider a network N , a matching M , and a price function pM . Let H be an
abstraction in fully connected networkss. If pM is such that M is stable in N at prices pM ,
then pM induces prices p∗ for each subnetwork in the abstraction as follows:
• If h contains only seller j, p∗(h) = µ(j),
• If h contains only buyer i, p∗(h) = b(i),
• If h contains a matched pair (i, j) ∈M , then p∗(h) = pM(i, j).
This is well defined because subnetworks are fully connected. Conversely, given a function p∗
that prices each subnetwork in the abstraction, this function induces prices pM in the original
network as follows:
• If (i, j) ∈M and link (i, j) is contained in subnetwork h, then pM(i, j) = p∗(h).
Given an abstraction of a network, a price function for the abstraction is a function p∗ that
assign a number (i.e. a price) to each node in the abstraction. We say a matching M ⊂ E
is stable with respect to an abstraction at prices p∗ when three conditions hold. First, the
abstraction does not breakM : each buyer-seller match inM belongs to the same subnetwork
in the abstraction. Second, prices p∗(·) induce pairwise stability in each subnetwork. Third,
if node h in the abstraction is linked to node h′, then p∗(h) ≤ p∗(h′). That h is linked to
h′ implies that some buyer in the subnetwork associated to h is linked to some seller in the
subnetwork associated to h′; thus, the “price” that prevails in h should be lower than the
price that prevails in h′. We call this last condition the “cheapest sorting” condition.
With these definitions we can state our first proposition.
Proposition 1. Let N be a network andM be a matching. Then the following are equivalent:
1. There exists a price function, pM , such that M is stable in N at prices pM .
2. There exists an abstraction in fully connected networks, and a price function p∗ for the
abstraction, such that M is stable with respect to the abstraction at prices p∗.
While most of the intuition for our results comes from Proposition 1, this proposition does
not characterize the full set of prices that support any given pairwise stable match. Indeed,
Proposition 1 tells us that any matching that is stable in a network N at some prices pM
is also stable with respect to some abstraction of N . Let H denote one such abstraction.
Then, through stability with respect to each subnetwork and cheapest sorting, H imposes a
set of constraints on price functions for the original network with the following property: if
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a different price function (say, p′M) satisfies the constraints imposed by H, then M is also
stable in N at p′M . In this sense, abstractions identify sets of prices (for the original network)
that make a matching stable. The problem is that, in general, the set of conditions on prices
imposed by any one abstraction are sufficient, but not necessary, for stability. The example
below shows this.
Example 3. The abstraction on the right imposes two constraints that prices need to sat-
isfy in order to make the match stable with respect to the abstraction: stability in ev-
ery subnetwork implies p∗(G) ∈ [b, µ(C)], p∗(G′) ∈ [µ(D), µ(B)]; cheapest sorting implies
p∗(G′) ≤ p∗(G). Notice that p∗ induces prices in the original network (say, pM) that make M
stable. However, there are other prices p′M that also make M stable in the original network
but induce prices p∗∗ on the abstraction that do not satisfy constraints mentioned above. For
example, p′M(1, A) = p′M(2, A) = µ(C) and p′M(3, B) = µ(B) are such thatM (in the original
network) is stable at p′M , but induce prices (p∗∗) in the abstraction that violate cheapest
sorting (they induce p∗∗(G) = µ(C) < µ(B) = p∗∗(G′)).
An Abstraction in
Network Fully Connected Subnetworks
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Proposition 2 identifies a class of abstractions, which we call maximal, such that the
constraints imposed by these abstractions are not only necessary but also sufficient for sta-
bility. After defining maximal abstractions we present an example and the statement of
proposition 2.
Definition (maximal abstraction). Let N be a network and M be a matching. We say
H is a maximal abstraction for M if for every unmatched buyer j, the subnetwork of H that
contains j, contains only j.
Example 4. The abstraction on the right is maximal for M . This abstraction places the
following constraints on prices that make M stable with respect to the abstraction: p∗(G) ∈
[µ(D), µ(C)], p∗(G′′) ∈ [µ(D), µ(B)]. Since this abstraction is maximal forM , then p∗ induce
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prices pM in the original network such that M is stable with respect to pM . Conversely, any
price function p′M that makesM stable in the original network induces a price function p∗∗ in
the abstraction that satisfies the above constraints. This is in contrast to example 3, where
the abstraction was not maximal.
An Abstraction in
Network Fully Connected Subnetworks
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Proposition 2. Let N be a network and M be a matching. Let H be a maximal abstraction
for M . Then M is stable with respect to some price function pM if and only if pM induces
prices p∗ in the abstraction such that M is stable with respect to H at prices p∗.
4.3 Proposition Application
In this subsection we illustrate four ways in which abstractions and the propositions are
useful to understand pairwise stable matches and their supporting prices. For this we use
Example 2.
First, propositions 1 and 2 are useful to decompose the prices that sustain pairwise stable
matches into a competitive component and an outside option component. We proceed in three
steps. (A) By proposition 2, any price function that makes M stable in the original network
induces prices p∗ that make M stable with respect to the maximal abstraction. Moreover,
consider nodes G′ and G as independent networks and note that they are fully connected
networks. (B) We use step (A) and Remark 1 to conclude three things: that buyers A,
B and C should match to sellers, that buyers B and C should pay a price between b and
µ(C), and that buyer A should pay between b and µ(A). Steps (A) and (B) imply that we
would observe these matches and supporting prices if these were two independent, perfectly
competitive economies. This is the competitive component of prices that sustain pairwise
stable matchings. (C) Note that buyer D is linked to seller 2, as indicated by the edge in
the abstraction that links G′′ to G′. Thus, any price that sustains a pairwise stable matching
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must also satisfy that buyers B and C pay sellers 2 and 3 no less than µ(D). Similarly, buyer
A pays to seller 1 no less than what B and C are paying to sellers 2 and 3. This is reflected by
the cheapest sorting condition, and is what we call the outside option component. Therefore,
Proposition 2 implies that all prices that support pairwise stable matchings (in the original
network) can be decomposed into competitive and outside option components.
Second, a corollary of the above decomposition is that, to calculate the prices that sustain
a particular stable matching, only the subnetworks and the links connecting the subnetworks
in a maximal abstraction are relevant. In particular, neither the identity nor the number
of buyer-seller pairs that generate those links is relevant. For example, consider a modified
network where the edge linking D to 2 is replaced by an edge linking D to 3. The original
matching is still stable in the abstraction at the original prices. Thus, this matching is also
stable in the modified network. Moreover, if the network had D linked to both 2 and 3, one
of those links would be redundant given the existance of the other. The relevant aspect of
these networks that sustains the proposed matching at the proposed prices is that at least
one buyer in {B,C} is connected to seller 1, and that D is linked to at least one seller in
{2, 3}. However the exact identities of these buyers and sellers is irrelevant. More generally,
given a pairwise stable matching, and a maximal abstraction for that matching, any network
obtained by drawing edges in a manner consistent with the abstraction will support the given
matching. Proposition 4 in the appendix formalizes this point.
Third, the Proposition 2 is also useful to characterize the set of all prices that can sustain
any given stable matching. In Example 2, a stable matching is M = {(C, 3), (A, 1), (B, 2)},
but there are many prices that can sustain M . Proceeding as we did before, we can conclude
that a price function p sustains M if and only if it satisfies the following properties:
• p(C, 3) = p(B, 2) ∈ [µ(D), µ(C)],
• p(A, 1) ∈ [p(B, 2), µ(A)].
Fourth, Proposition 2 is also useful to prove that the algorithm in Section 5 finds pairwise
stable matchings in any given network, and the upper and lower bounds of the set of prices
that sustain those matchings. In Section 5 we present a description of the algorithm and its
properties. In Appendix C we present the formal algorithm and formal proofs.
4.4 Labor Market Model with On-the-job Search
In this section we adapt the buyer-seller model to the labor market, where workers are sellers
and firms are buyers. We assume workers do on-the-job search and that firms have single
unit demand, so a firm is equivalent to a vacancy.
At the beginning of period 1, a finite bipartite graph is randomly drawn between workers
and firms. We use (I1,J1, E1) to denote the time 1 graph, where I1 is the set of period
1 workers, J1 is the set of period 1 firms, and E1 is the set of links between buyers and
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sellers. Let I and J denote the respective number of workers and firms, and we define market
tightness as the ratio of J to unemployed workers, denoted as θ1. Conditional on the graph we
assign productivities to firms, denoted with µ(·), drawn i.i.d. from a continuous distribution
F with support in the interval [µ, µ]. To keep the model simple we assume that all workers
have the same reservation wage. Using the notation of the buyer-seller model, b(i) = b for
each i ∈ I1.
After the period 1 graph has been realized, we pick a specific pairwise stable matching
M01 at wages wM01 using the algorithm that we describe in Section 5. Matched firms receive a
period utility of µ(j)−wM01 (j, i∗(j)), matched workers receive a period utility of wM01 (j∗(i), i),
unmatched workers receive their reservation wage b, and unmatched firms receive utility 0
and leave. After these utilities are realized, there is an exogenous job destruction shock.
This means that each match m ∈M01 is dissolved with probability δ > 0. Firms whose links
are dissolved become unmatched and leave the market. We denote with M1 the period 1
matching after the exogenous job destruction.
Now consider the beginning of period t ≥ 2. Given the matching Mt−1 of period t − 1,
we add J new firms and no new workers (i.e. It = It−1). We draw the productivities for
these new firms from the same distribution F . We randomly draw links between workers
and firms that satisfy the following three conditions. First, positive probability is assigned
only to graphs with vertices in It ∪ Jt, where these denote the set of period t workers and
firms, respectively. Second, matches from period t−1 are not dissolved (formally,Mt−1 ⊂ Et,
where Et is the set of period t edges). Finally, matched firms receive no new applications, but
matched workers may apply to new firms because they can do on-the-job search (that is, if
(j, i) ∈Mt−1 then {i′ : (j, i′) ∈ Et} = {i}, but no constraints are placed on {j′ : (j′, i) ∈ Et}).
We denote the corresponding graph with (It,Jt, Et). The reservation wage of workers who
were not matched in t− 1 is b; the reservation wage for workers who were matched in t− 1 is
the worker’s wage, wMt−1 . As before, the period utility for matched firms are their profits, the
period utility for matched workers are their wages, the period utility of unmatched workers
are their reservation wages, and the period utility of unmatched firms are 0 and these leave.
Finally, period t utilities are discounted at a rate βt, with β ∈ (0, 1).
We are applying the buyer-seller model within each period, so pairwise stable matchings
are independently formed period by period. Determining the matches in this way implies
that workers accept the vacancy that pays the highest wage and hence, do not consider other
aspects of the match, such as future wage growth. From the firm’s perspective this is without
loss of generality: if they are unmatched at the end of a period they leave, so their static
and dynamic problems coincide. From the workers perspective, however, there is a loss of
generality. To see this consider worker i that is matched to firm j at wage w at the end of
period t, and assume that in period t + 1 firm j′ will only be linked with i. To rule out the
trivial case, assume that µ(j′) > w. Then worker i will expect a wage in period t + 1 that
belongs to [min{µ(j), µ(j′)},max{µ(j), µ(j′)}]. Hence, worker i is willing to work for a more
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productive firm in period t even if that firm offers slightly lower salaries than the competitors.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no standard solution concept for dynamic matching
markets when matching opportunities arrive over time. For a more thorough discussion of
the complications that arise in dynamic matching models see, for example, Doval (2014). For
this reason, relaxing this assumption is left for future work.
5 A Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
We now present the deferred acceptance algorithm. We describe the algorithm as a first-price
auction to give intuition of how the algorithm works. A formal description of the algorithm
can be found in Section C in the appendix. We denote the agents on the side of the market
that are holding the “auctions” as sellers and the agents on the other side that are “bidding”
as bidders. Recall that we are approaching this problem from the matching perspective, so
we are not making any statement about the actual economic mechanisms or incentives of the
agents that determine prices and matches. Bidders bid in increments of ∆
2
. The value of ∆
is set so that the productivity of firms lie in a ∆ grid. Formally, for all j, µ(j) = b + kj∆
for some integer kj that is randomly drawn at the start of the algorithm. We describe the
algorithm for the case where the sellers hold the auctions. When buyers hold the auctions,
the bidding starts at their valuation and prices decrease.
The algorithm has two stages. The first stage outputs an allocation and is motivated by
the wage adjusting process in Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford (1982).
(See Section C in the appendix for a detailed comparison of the first stage of our algorithm
and the algorithms in Crawford and Knoer and Kelso and Crawford.) This allocation has
the property that there exist prices for which it is pairwise stable. The second stage outputs
two prices: the pointwise minimum price at which the stage 1 allocation is stable, and the
pointwise maximum price at which the stage 1 allocation is stable.
Stage 1: The Matching Determination Program
The algorithm starts in round t = 1 when none of the sellers has received any bid. All
bidders are placed into a queue and arrive sequentially. The entering order of the bidders is
determined randomly. The standing bid of a seller is the last bid accepted by the seller or b
if the seller has not received any bids. The winning bidder is the bidder who placed the last
standing bid.
This is round t of the matching determination program.
1. Take the first bidder in the queue (for concreteness, call it bidder j). Bidder j selects
the seller with the lowest standing bid among the linked sellers. If there is more than
one such seller, the bidder selects one of these sellers at random. Call it seller i. If
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the lowest standing bid is greater than µ(j)− ∆
2
, bidder j does nothing and leaves the
queue. Otherwise, bidder j bids the standing bid of seller i plus ∆
2
.
2. If bidder j makes a bid, seller i accepts the bid from bidder j. The new standing bid
of seller i is now the previous standing bid plus ∆
2
. Bidder j leaves the queue. If there
was a bidder j′ who was the winning bidder (before bidder j bid), bidder j′ is placed
at the end of the queue.
3. The algorithm continues from step 1 with the next bidder in the queue. The algorithm
stops when there are no bidders left in the queue. In this case, each seller is matched
to the winning bidder.
We now present the second stage, the price determination program. The key insight of
this stage is that, if a seller i is matched to a buyer j, and is also linked to an unmatched
buyer j′, then the price j pays i must price j′ out of the market. That is, pM(i, j) ≥ µ(j′).
Moreover, if seller i is matched to buyer j, and seller i is also linked to a buyer j′ who is also
matched (say, to a seller i′) then i must be getting payed at least what i′ is getting payed.
Otherwise, j′ would like to block with i.
Stage 2: The Price Determination Program (I)
The program starts in round t = 1 with M ⊂ E produced from stage 1 as its input.
1. Set the “price” of all unmatched sellers to b.
2. For matched sellers, set the price of seller i for buyer j to the maximum µ(j′) amongst
all j′ that are linked to i but are not matched.
3. We call these prices (ρ1i )i∈I .
This is round t > 1 of the price determination algorithm. We take (ρt−1i )i∈I as inputs for
this round.
1. Set the “price” of all unmatched sellers in round t to b.
2. For matched sellers, set the price of each seller i for buyer j to the maximum price in
round t − 1 of the matched buyers that are linked to i. That is, amongst all matched
j′ that are linked to i, set ρti to the maximum ρ
t−1
i∗(j′). Note that one such j
′ is j itself,
so these prices form a non-decreasing sequence.
3. If ρti = ρ
t−1
i for all i, stop the algorithm and output these prices. Otherwise, start step
t+ 1.
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As formally stated in Proposition 3, the Price Determination Program (I) captures the
pointwise minimum price function at which M is stable. A modified version of this program,
which we call Price Determination Program (II), generates the pointwise maximum price
function at which M is stable. Rather than starting with ρ1 at a low value, with successive
iterations iterations rising it, the modified program starts with ρ1 at high values and successive
iterations lower it. Section C contains the formal algorithm, including both versions of the
Price Determination Program.
Proposition 3. The deferred acceptance algorithm has the following properties:
1. It stops after a finite number of rounds.
2. It outputs a pairwise stable allocation.
3. Price Determination program (I) outputs the pointwise minimum price function at
which M is stable.
4. Price Determination program (II) outputs the pointwise maximum price function at
which M is stable.
The proof of Proposition 3 is in section C in the appendix.
6 Results
In the next two subsections we document the results from simulations of the buyer-seller and
the labor-market models. We use the results from the simulation to obtain predictions about
the population distribution of prices and the matching process.
6.1 Buyer-Seller Model
6.1.1 Simulation
We now describe the simulation of the buyer-seller model.
There are three parameters in the buyer-seller model: the number of buyers (J), the
number of sellers (I), and the expected number of links per buyer (ELB). Every seller begins
with one unit of a good (so the number of goods is I). The market tightness, θ, is the ratio
of the number of buyers to the number of sellers, θ = J
I
. The market tightness is exogenous.
We start the baseline simulation with I = 10, 000 identical sellers and J = 10, 000 × θ
heterogeneous buyers.23 We consider markets with J ∈ [1000, 50000], so θ ∈ [0.1, 5]. We
also consider markets with ELB ∈ [1, 10].24 The higher the ELB, the lower the search
frictions in the market. The product of the number of buyers and the ELB determines the
23The results do not change substantially using 1,000 or 100,000 sellers. Results are available upon request.
24We obtain similar results by varying expected links per seller (ELS) in the simulations.
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number of active links in the market. The total number of possible links in the market is
J × I. The proportion of active links relative to the total number of possible links in a
network is a measure of the sparsity of the network. Given the parameters J , I, and ELB, a
network is formed by randomly drawing buyers and sellers to form links. Once the network
is constructed, we apply the algorithm from Section 5 to the network. The “bids” in the first
stage of the algorithm take place on a grid of possible prices with 2J grid points.
Buyers’ valuation is normalized to range between 0 and 100 which bounds the minimum
and maximum prices between those values. One can interpret the reported prices as if
the buyers’ valuations are drawn from a uniform distribution, whose support is normalized
between 0 and 100. Alternatively, one can interpret the prices or valuations as percentiles of
any cumulative distribution function of the buyers’ valuations. The second interpretation is
possible because the allocations and prices only depend on order statistics and not the actual
valuations.
We compare the price distributions to the Walrasian outcome, when each buyer is linked
to every seller. The Walrasian outcome price, pwalras, is given by:
pwalras =
 0 if θ ≤ 1(1− 1
θ
)× 100 if θ > 1.
Recall that the Walrasian outcome has a unique price (see Remark 1). When θ ≤ 1, there
are more sellers than buyers and so there is always a seller who is indifferent between selling
the good at 0 or not selling it at all. In other words, the reservation price of the marginal
seller is zero, which is what determines the market price. When θ > 1, there are more buyers
than sellers. Only 1
θ
of the buyers will buy the good. Hence the valuation of the marginal
buyer will be (1− 1
θ
)× 100. This buyer will be indifferent between paying (1− 1
θ
)× 100 and
leaving the market, and so the market price will be (1− 1
θ
)× 100.
6.1.2 Results
Distribution of Prices. Figure 1 displays the distribution of prices for the buyer-preferred
match by market tightness (horizontal axis in each panel) and ELB (different panels). Each
vertical box corresponds to a simulated market characterized by those parameters. Each
panel shows the population distribution of prices for different levels of search frictions in
different markets. The top-left panel shows the price distribution for high frictions, where
ELB equals 1. The top-right and bottom panels show what happens in markets with lower
frictions (when ELB equals 2, 3, and 5, respectively). At low levels of θ there are many sellers
for each buyer. So low numbers for θ indicate “loose” seller markets where sellers are at a
disadvantage. In addition, each panel displays the Walrasian outcome.
For market tightness less than one, the market looks like a monopsony and nearly all sellers
are paid their valuation (recall that, for simplicity, all sellers are identical, so we normalized
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their valuation to zero). This is because it is unlikely for a seller to receive multiple links.
Even if a seller receives two links, it is likely that at least one of the buyers has an outside
option of zero. This happens if the buyer is also linked with another seller who has no other
links.
On the other hand, as market tightness is increased the market becomes more competitive
between buyers and more favorable for sellers. The median price increases as does price
dispersion. There are now many buyers linked to each seller and the buyers have worse
outside options. Even if a buyer is linked to a second seller, it is likely that the second seller
is linked to many other buyers. In markets with lower frictions, competition between buyers
increases, thus increasing prices until they reach the Walrasian outcome.
Figure 2 shows that similar results to the ones in Figure 1 are obtained using the seller-
preferred match. Figure 2 displays, for each market tightness, the distribution of prices using
both the seller- and the buyer-preferred match. (For the buyer-preferred match, each vertical
box in Figure 2 is identical to the corresponding vertical box in Figure 1.) When ELB equals
5, the 95th and 5th price percentiles coincide with the Walrasian outcome for both the buyer-
and the seller- preferred match. The prices in the buyer-preferred matching represents the
lower bound of the set of prices that support each match. Likewise, the prices in the seller-
preferred match represents the upper-bound of the set of prices that support each match.
Since both the seller-preferred and buyer-preferred price distributions mimic the Walrasian
outcome when ELB=5, it must be true that the price distribution in any allocation that
supports a pairwise stable match must also mimic the Walrasian outcome.
Price Dispersion and the Walrasian Outcome. Price dispersion decreases when search
frictions decrease. There are many buyers linked to each seller, but there are also many
sellers linked to each buyer, improving the outside options of both parties. These improved
outside options reduces price dispersion (i.e. the likelihood that a seller has to take a low
price is low, but at the same time the probability that a buyer has to pay a high price
is also low). Figure 3 shows the evolution of the price distribution for the buyer-preferred
match. In the top panel, the figure displays the difference between the 95th and the 5th
price percentiles. In the bottom panel, the figure displays the difference between the 99.5th
and 0.5th price percentiles. All sellers are paid the same price at the Walrasian outcome, so
both differences equal zero at the Walrasian outcome. We are interested in answering the
following two questions: How sparse can the network be while 90% and 99% of sellers are
paid the same price? While there is price dispersion when there are fewer than four ELB, the
price distribution begins to collapse for more ELB. When there are five ELB, there is nearly
no difference between the price at the 95th and 5th percentiles. Likewise, when there are
eight ELB, there is almost no difference between the price at the 99.5th and 0.5th percentile.
In other words, at least 90% or 99% of the sellers are paid the same price when the number
of active links relative to the total number of links is only 5/10,000 or 8/10,000, respectively.
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The price distribution in the model collapses with less than 0.1% of the possible links in the
network.
The Effect of Frictions on Mean Prices. Figure 4 displays the evolution of mean
prices (where the expectation is taken relative to the population distribution of prices) over
ELB for different market tightness. Mean prices represent the buyers’ and sellers’ ex ante
expected prices before the network is drawn. The figure shows how mean prices vary with
ELB (i.e. frictions) in a given market (holding fixed the market tightness), so mean prices are
normalized by the mean price when ELB equals 1. Increasing ELB may increase or decrease
mean prices, depending on market tightness. For example, consider markets where there are
many sellers for each buyer (θ ≤ 1, so that sellers are at a disadvantage). When ELB is
low, price dispersion is high, even when there are more sellers than buyers (top-left panel in
Figure 1), resulting in relatively high mean prices. As ELB increases, the price distribution
collapses to the Walrasian outcome (Figure 3). The Walrasian outcome is zero when there
are more sellers than buyers. Thus, when there are more sellers than buyers (θ ≤ 1), lowering
frictions results in lower mean prices as a consequence of indirect competition. Intuitively,
since there are more sellers than buyers, increasing ELB improves the outside option of the
buyers who now talk to relatively more sellers, even when sellers expect to talk to more
buyers.25
Distribution of Matched Buyers. Figure 5 shows the distribution of matched buyers
for different markets. In loose markets (θ < 1), the probability of finding a match does
not depend on the buyer’s valuation. Prices are low and there are many unmatched sellers,
so buyers have a roughly equal chance of finding a match. The ELB does not change the
distributions of matched buyers in loose markets.
As markets become tighter (θ > 1), competition between buyers becomes more important.
In these markets, prices are higher and some buyers are priced out of the market. Buyers
with high valuations (e.g. above the Walrasian price) are more likely to buy goods than
buyers with low valuations. When ELB is low, buyers with high valuations may be linked
to a seller with another high-valuation buyer. Since they have few links, they are priced out
of the market. For markets with higher ELB, buyers have better outside options and the
probability that a high-valuation buyer is priced out of the market decreases. When ELB=5,
the distribution of matched buyers looks close to the Walrasian outcome, where all buyers
with µ(j) > pwalras are matched and all buyers with µ(j) < pwalras are priced out of the
market.
Welfare. Results on the welfare in the buyer-seller model are in the online appendix (see
Figure A1). We analyze welfare using the labor market model on page 30, where the results
25Same results are obtained using expected links per seller (ELS) instead of ELB. When there are more
sellers than buyers (θ ≤ 1), increasing ELS results in lower mean prices. Results are available upon request.
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are similar to the buyer-seller model.
6.2 Labor Market Model
6.2.1 Simulation
We adapt the buyer-seller model to the labor market to explore questions about wage dis-
persion and growth. In this case, workers are sellers and firms are buyers of their services.
Firms have single unit demand for labor and cannot dismiss their employee. We assume that
workers are homogeneous and firms are heterogeneous in their productivity (µ(j)).26 We
normalize the reservation wage of the worker to zero. If a worker and firm match at wage w,
the worker’s utility is w and the firm’s profit is µ(j)−w. Wages and firm productivities are
normalized to range between 0 and 100 as in the buyer-seller model. To study wage growth,
we extend our model to accommodate multiple periods.
In the first period all workers start unemployed and the simulation is identical to the
basic buyer-seller model (see subsection 6.1). At the end of the period, some matches are
randomly destroyed at rate δ ∈ (0, 1). The firms that are unmatched at the end of a period
(either because the match was destroyed or they could not form a match in the first place)
exit the market. We interpret “firms” as time sensitive vacancies. So if by the end of a period
a vacancy is not filled, it disappears from the job market.
At the beginning of the next period, some fraction of workers are employed by old firms
and the rest are unemployed. The same number of firms are created (J) and a new network
is drawn between all the workers (employed and unemployed) and the new firms. Firms from
previous periods maintain the link to their employed worker and lose all other links from
previous periods. New firms are placed into the queue and old firms start off as the highest
bidders in their employee’s “auction”. So from the standpoint of the algorithm, the standing
bid (or reservation wage) in an employed worker’s auction is the wage from the previous
period. The new firms either “bid” for unemployed workers or try to poach employed workers
from old firms by bidding in the auctions of the employed workers. Firms from previous
periods can only bid in their employee’s auction. When firms arrive at the front of the
queue, they bid in their subnetworks according to the algorithm (see Section 5). The bidding
process ends when there are no more firms in the queue. Matched firms produce with the
hired workers and the workers receive their wage. At the end of the period matches receive
a job destruction shock at rate δ.
We consider markets that are in steady state. The market is in steady state when the
flows into unemployment equal the flows out of unemployment. We find the steady state by
26Worker heterogeneity is important for understanding wage dispersion in the data and it is straightforward
to add worker heterogeneity to our model. However, not including worker heterogeneity makes the exposition
of our results more clear as the Walrasian outcome has a unique wage.
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simulating the economy for enough periods until the average unemployment remains stable.27
Then we record 400 periods.
The labor-market model has five parameters: the number of workers (I), which is constant
for all periods, the number of firms (J) that enter in each period, the expected number of
links per firm (ELF), the job destruction rate (δ), and the relative probability of receiving a
link between employed and unemployed workers (λ). The market tightness, θ, is defined as
the ratio of firms to unemployed workers, J
U
. In contrast to the basic buyer-seller model, θ is
now endogenous as it depends on the number of unemployed workers (U).
Both the number of workers and the job destruction rate are fixed for all simulations.
Following Shimer (2012), the monthly employment to unemployment rate is set at 2% (prime
age men, Figure 3), which translates to a quarterly δ = 0.06. We use 5,000 workers for the
simulation of the dynamic labor market model.28 A market is a combination of J and ELF.
The relative probability of receiving a link between employed and unemployed workers
(λ) is an important determinant of the structure of the network. Most empirical studies
find different job offer rates between employed and unemployed workers.29 This is important
for understanding allocations and wage growth, since indirect competition is substantially
diminished when θ < 1 and λ = 1. To understand why, recall that when θ < 1, there
are more unemployed workers (U) than vacancies entering the market (J). Even when the
unemployment rate is relatively high (10%-20%), firms have a low probability of linking
with an unemployed worker when λ = 1. So even in markets that appear unfavorable for
the workers (high unemployment and low market tightness), it is difficult for the firms to
link to unemployed workers when λ = 1. This implies that in these markets, unemployed
workers do not have to compete with each other. If we follow the empirical literature by
setting λ < 1, then firms have a higher probability of linking with an unemployed worker
and indirect competition again becomes important even when market tightness is low.
To make the comparison to labor-search models, we use a model of Bertrand competition
between two firms as our benchmark. For example, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) (hence-
forth PVR) allows two firms to compete over the wages (à la Bertrand) of an employed worker
and is closest to our model. The PVR framework in terms of networks is as follows. Given
a set of firms, workers, and a matching technology à la PVR, construct the corresponding
network with the same set of firms and workers, where a worker is linked to a firm if, and
only if, the worker and the firm are matched by the matching technology. An important
assumption in most search models, including PVR, is that a firm can negotiate with at most
27We compute the average unemployment over 10 consecutive periods and compare it to the average
unemployment 10 periods before. We find the steady state when this difference is less than the tolerance
level. The convergence is relatively fast. It takes between 30 to 100 periods (depending on the values of the
parameters) to find the steady state. Let Ut be the unemployment in period t in a specific market and let
U¯t =
1
10
∑t
j=t−9 Uj be the average unemployment of the 10 periods ending in t. We find the steady state,
tSS , as follows: | U¯tSS−10 − U¯tSS |< , where  is a tolerance level.
28The results do not change much when using 1,000 or 10,000 workers. Results are available upon request.
29See Holzer (1987) and Blau and Robins (1990) for an investigation on different search intensities and
offer rates for employed and unemployed workers.
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one worker and, in PVR, a worker can negotiate with at most two firms. This limits the type
of networks that are realized and drives most of the differences between search models and
our model.
We also compare our results to a perfectly competitive model (Walrasian outcome) in
steady state. Recall that a market is in steady state when the flows into unemployment
equal the flows out of unemployment. In the Walrasian outcome, all unemployed workers
find jobs when θ ≥ 1 (i.e. there are more vacancies than unemployed workers). So the
number of employed workers in steady state at the end of a period is the total number of
workers in the market adjusted by the separation rate, I × (1− δ). When θ < 1, the fraction
of unemployed workers in steady state, uSS, is given by equalizing the flow of workers out of
and into unemployment: [
uss + δ(1− uss)
]
θ = δ(1− uss),
where uss is the unemployment rate before the job separation shock.30 The left-hand side
represents the number of firms that hire workers (θ times the fraction of unemployed at the
beginning of a period). The right-hand side represents the number of workers that lose their
jobs. Thus, uSS = δ(1−θ)(1−δ)θ+δ when θ < 1. Then, the number of employed workers in the
Walrasian outcome, ESS, is given by ESS = I × (1− uss). Due to the multi-period aspect of
the model, the number of firms employing a worker in steady state, ESS, is greater than the
number of firms that enter in each period, ESS > J .
6.2.2 Results
Distribution of Wages. Following the empirical results in Bagger, Fontaine, Postel-Vinay,
and Robin (2014), we set λ = 0.05. This implies that an unemployed worker is twenty times
more likely to receive a link than an employed worker. Setting λ below one concentrates
the network between the new vacancies and the unemployed workers. Figure 6 displays the
distribution of wages in different markets when λ = 0.05.31 (This figure is similar to Figure 1
but for the dynamic labor market model.) All workers now compete with unemployed workers
and the average wage is close to the Walrasian outcome when ELF equals five.
Worker Mobility and Wage Growth. To analyze worker mobility and wage growth we
keep λ = 0.05. Figure 7 shows the wage profiles of workers after an unemployment spell. In
loose markets, workers start out with low wages and wages grow very slowly. In tight markets
with low frictions, workers attain a high wage immediately out of unemployment and then
their wages grow very little over their career. This leads to the result that as you reduce
30We use lowercase letters for rates (e.g. the unemployment rate is u) and uppercase letters for levels (e.g.
the number of unemployed workers is U).
31Figure A2 in the online appendix displays the distribution of wages in different markets when λ = 1. As
discussed in the previous section, λ = 1 is inconsistent with the empirical literature and suppresses indirect
competition. Comparing figures 6 and A2 shows the effect that including indirect competition has on wage
dispersion and average wages.
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frictions, workers have lower median wage growth. Figure 8 (top panel) shows the median
wage growth after twenty periods of employment. As a benchmark, we also display the wage
growth for the Bertrand competition benchmark (see subsubsection 6.2.1). When θ < 1,
wage growth is reduced because firms have better outside options. When θ > 1, reducing
frictions causes firms to compete strongly for workers. This drives initial wages up leaving
little room for wage growth.
The lower panel of Figure 8 displays the worker mobility, which is defined as the fraction
of workers that make a job-to-job transition in a period. The intuition for why worker
mobility decreases as frictions are lowered is similar to wage growth. When θ < 1, firms
are less likely to poach workers from another firm because they have better outside options
that likely include an unemployed worker. When θ > 1, workers are less likely to move from
one firm to another because when they enter the labor market they immediately find a job
that pays a high wage. Our results indicate that empirical researchers should be cautious
when using worker mobility to make inference about the level of frictions in a market where
indirect competition is present.
Welfare. To analyze welfare we need a welfare criterion. In the labor market model,
the utility function of the firms that hire a worker is the production function minus the
wage, µ(j) − w(j), and the utility function of the workers that are hired is the wage, w(j).
We use the utilitarian welfare criterion, Ω, that is sum of these utilities and corresponds to
Ω =
∑J˜
j=1 µ(j), where j = 1, . . . , J˜ index the firms that hire a worker. The unconstrained
first-best allocation is the one that maximizes the welfare in the absence of frictions. It
corresponds to the Walrasian outcome.32
Following Bagger, Fontaine, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2014), we use the following cumu-
lative distribution function for the productivity of firms:
F (µ) = 1− exp
(
− [c1(µ− c0)]c2),
where c0 = 5, c1 = 8, and c2 = 0.7. Thus, the utilitarian welfare in each market, Ω,
represents the aggregate production in that market.
Figure 9 displays the aggregate production (welfare) and average labor productivity for
different levels of frictions and for the Walrasian outcome (i.e. unconstrained first-best
allocation).33 The top panel in Figure 9 shows the ratio of the aggregate production in our
model relative to the aggregate production in the Walrasian outcome.34 As ELF is increased,
the aggregate production in our model is close to the aggregate production in the Walrasian
32The same welfare analysis holds for the buyer-seller market using buyers, sellers, prices, and a single
period. We obtain similar results. See Figure A1 in the online appendix.
33All specifications display the aggregate production in steady state at the end of the period after the
destruction shock occurred. So, ESS ≤ I × (1 − δ) in our model, and ESS = I × (1 − δ) in the Walrasian
outcome. The results do not change substantially if the welfare is calculated before the destruction shock
occurs.
34Figure A5 in the online appendix shows the total aggregate production.
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outcome. For example, when θ = 0.5 and ELF=5, the aggregate production is approximately
97.5% of the aggregate production in the Walrasian outcome. So even in sparse networks,
markets are close to the unconstrained first-best allocation.
We also investigate the allocation of workers to firms. The bottom panel of Figure 9
displays the average productivity of jobs of employed workers. We find that lowering frictions
can improve or worsen the allocation of workers to more productive firms. In loose markets
(lower θ), reducing frictions lowers average labor market productivity. The intuition is that
when frictions are high, firms are less likely to have an outside option when linked with
an employed worker. This leads to competition between firms. When frictions are lower,
firms are more likely to have another link to an unemployed worker. Hence, there is less
competition between firms. Recall that when there are no frictions and θ < 1, there is no
competition between firms since there are more unemployed workers than firms. In tight
markets (high θ), lower frictions leads to the allocation of workers to the more productive
firms as in standard search models.
7 Concluding Remarks
The defining characteristic of markets with frictions is that similar goods or services are
traded at different prices, resulting in price dispersion. In this paper we use networks to
characterize pairwise stable allocations and their supporting prices in buyer-seller markets
with frictions. The central insight of the paper is that including indirect competition causes
markets with frictions to have prices and allocations that look close to the Walrasian outcome.
To study prices in large networks, we develop an algorithm that finds the upper and lower
bounds of the set of prices that sustain any pairwise stable match. Indirect competition
reverses the relationship between the level of frictions and many economic outcomes. We
find that lowering frictions leads to: 1) lower wage growth, 2) lower worker mobility, and 3)
lower expected prices in loose markets (θ < 1).
The main finding of our paper, that sparse networks look as if they were perfectly com-
petitive, might seem inconsistent with the price dispersion observed in eBay, labor markets,
automobile markets, etc. There are three dimensions in which our model provides a richer
understanding of frictions and price dispersion. Consider the case of eBay, where search
frictions arise because its search engine is quite sensitive to the buyers’ search inquiry and to
the sellers’ title for the product listing. In addition, buyers most likely do not compare all
the listings for a given product at a given time. First, one possible explanation for the price
dispersion is that search frictions are relatively high (i.e. ELB< 3 or buyers participate in
less than three auctions on average). But this is unlikely to be the whole answer. Second,
the structure of the network is an important factor in the formation of prices. Although our
networks are generated by randomly forming links, this is clearly not the case at eBay. All
buyers who make the same search inquiry receive the same list of items or products. Price
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dispersion in eBay may be more about the structure of the network and less about the abso-
lute level of frictions. Third, our model makes clear predictions on the distribution of prices
for any network. Given information on the participation of buyers in auctions, the actual
network can be constructed. This can be used to decompose the sources of price dispersion
into frictions and other factors, such as unobserved heterogeneity.
Econometric methods where identification is based on minimal assumptions provide a ro-
bust structural framework for inference improving credibility and robustness of the empirical
analysis.35 In this context, using pairwise stability as our matchmaking criterion can be used
to develop an empirical framework in the spirit of credible econometrics.36 Since pairwise sta-
bility is the weakest criterion for matchmaking that is consistent with Pareto efficiency, not
specifying the game details allows the econometrician to weaken the behavioral assumptions
that would otherwise be imposed by a specific game.
Our model sheds some light on a puzzle about the recent recovery from the Great Re-
cession in the US. Empirical studies show that wage growth is lower compared to previous
recoveries at the same unemployment rate (Yellen, 2014). Our model predicts that lower fric-
tions imply lower wage growth. If we assume that search frictions in the labor market have
been decreasing over time due to new technologies, our model provides a possible explanation
for this puzzle.
When considering empirical applications, there are a number of ways the model could be
enriched. For example, an application to eBay might consider endogenous search intensity.
An application to the labor market might consider a more realistic production function in-
cluding heterogeneity of both workers and firms, endogenous search intensity and endogenous
entry of firms. The goal of this paper is to construct a parsimonious model that demonstrates
the importance of indirect competition in price dispersion, wage growth, allocations of goods
and workers, etc. Enriching the model in other dimensions is an avenue for future research.
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Figure 1: Price Distribution: Buyer-Preferred Match.
Notes: Starting in the top left, panels 1 to 4 figure display the empirical distribution of prices from the
model using the buyer-preferred match disaggregated by: i) Market Tightness (which ranges from 0.1 to 5
in the horizontal axis in each graph) and ii) Expected Links per Buyer (1, 2, 3, and 5). Each vertical box
corresponds to a simulated market characterized by those parameters. Each vertical box displays the 95th
percentile (upper whisker), 75th percentile (upper hinge), median (black circle marker), 25th percentile (lower
hinge), and 5th percentile (lower whisker). Note that buyers’ valuation is normalized to range between 0 and
100 which, in turn, bounds the minimum and maximum prices between those values. If the 95th percentile
coincides with the 5th percentile, then the figure shows only a dot (which corresponds to the median too).
In addition, each panel displays the Walrasian outcome, pwalras. We describe how to calculate the Walrasian
outcome in subsection 6.1.
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Figure 2: Price Distribution: Buyer- vs. Seller-Preferred Matches.
Notes: At each market tightness, panels 1 to 4 display the distribution of prices in the model using the sellers
and the buyer-preferred match. For the seller-preferred match, each vertical box in this figure is identical to
the corresponding vertical box in Figure 1. In addition, each panel displays the Walrasian outcome, pwalras.
We describe how to calculate the Walrasian outcome in subsection 6.1. See the notes in Figure 1 for a
description of the vertical boxes.
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Figure 3: Price Dispersion and the Walrasian Outcome.
Notes: The top (bottom) figure displays the difference between the 95th (99.5th) price percentile and the
5th (0.5th) price percentile for different market tightness and expected links per buyer using a Nadaraya
Watson kernel regression (of the percentile difference on market tightness) with an Epanechnikov kernel with
bandwidth selected by cross validation. Price distributions are generated using the buyer-preferred match in
a market with 10,000 sellers.
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Figure 4: The Effect of Frictions on Mean Prices.
Notes: The figure displays the evolution of mean prices over expected links per buyer for different market
tightness. For each market tightness, mean prices are normalized by the mean price when the expected links
per buyer is one. So, by construction, mean prices for each market tightness coincide when the expected links
per buyer is one.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Matched Buyers.
Notes: Each of the four panels in the figure displays the univariate kernel density estimation of the buyers’
valuations distribution (buyers who bought a good from a seller) for three markets that differ in the ELB
(1, 2, and 5) and for a given market tightness. In addition, each panel displays the distribution of matched
buyers in the Walrasian outcome. We describe how to calculate the Walrasian outcome in subsection 6.1.
Let µ denote buyers’ valuation in the market. We estimate the probability density function in each market,
f (µ), as: fˆK (µ;h) = 1N h
∑N
j=1K
(
µ−µ(j)
h
)
, where K (z) is a standard univariate gaussian kernel function,
h is the bandwidth that we choose by cross validation, and µ(j) , j = 1, . . . , N are the valuations of the
buyers who bought a good in each market. Note that we normalize buyers’ valuation to range between 0
and 100 which, in turn, bounds the minimum and maximum prices between those values. Each valuation
value between 0 and 100, can be interpreted as the percentile for any distribution of buyers’ valuations.
Given that the price distribution has its domain bounded we use a renormalization method to deal with the
boundaries when estimating the productivity probability density function.
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Figure 6: Wage Distribution in the Labor Market Model (λ = 0.05).
Notes: The figure displays the distribution of wages in the labor market model with λ = 0.05 (see sub-
section 6.2.1). All figures display the firm-preferred match. Starting in the top left, panel one shows the
empirical distribution of wages for our benchmark, a model with Bertrand competition between at most two
firms (see subsection 6.2.1). Panels 2 to 4 figure display the empirical distribution of wages from the model
using the firm-preferred match disaggregated by: i) Market Tightness (which ranges from 0.1 to 5 in the
horizontal axis in each graph) and ii) Expected Links per firm (1, 2, and 5). Each vertical box corresponds to
a simulated market characterized by those parameters. Each vertical box displays the 95th percentile (upper
whisker), 75th percentile (upper hinge), median (black circle marker), 25th percentile (lower hinge), and 5th
percentile (lower whisker). Note that firms’ productivity is normalized to range between 0 and 100 which,
in turn, bounds the minimum and maximum wages between those values. If the 95th percentile coincides
with the 5th percentile, then the figure shows only a dot (which corresponds to the median too). In addition,
each panel displays the Walrasian outcome, wwalras. We describe how to calculate the Walrasian outcome in
subsection 6.1, where in the case of the labor market wwalras = pwalras.
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Figure 8: Mean Wage Growth and Worker Mobility in the Labor Market Model.
Notes: The top figure displays wage growth by market tightness and expected number of links per firm. The
wage growth is defined as the wage of the worker in period 20 minus the wage of the same worker in period
1. We use the sample of workers who have been employed for at least 20 periods. The bottom figure displays
the worker mobility by market tightness and expected number of links per firm. Worker mobility is defined
as the probability that an employed worker makes a job-to-job transition in a period. For both figures, we set
λ = 0.05 and use the firm-preferred match (see subsection 6.2.1). As a benchmark, we also display the results
for a model restricted to have Bertrand competition between at most two firms (see subsection 6.2.1).
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Figure 9: Welfare in the Labor Market Model.
Notes: The top panel displays the aggregate production relative to the Walrasian outcome by ELF and by
market tightness. For example, when θ = 0.5 and ELF=5, the aggregate production is approximately 97.5% of
the aggregate production in the Walrasian outcome. The aggregate production in each market represents the
utilitarian welfare in that market. Figure A5 in the online appendix shows the total aggregate production.
The bottom panel displays the average productivity per worker (total production divided by number of
employees) for different markets. As a benchmark, we also display the results for a model restricted to have
Bertrand competition between at most two firms (see subsection 6.2.1). We set λ = 0.05 and use the firm-
preferred match (see subsection 6.2.1). Following Bagger, Fontaine, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2014), we use
the following cumulative distribution function for the productivity of firms F (µ) = 1−exp
(
−[c1(µ−c0)]c2),
where c0 = 5, c1 = 8, and c2 = 0.7. 45
Appendix
A Formal Definitions
Definition (graph). Given a set V of nodes and a set E ⊂ V 2 of edges we say (V,E) is
a graph. Moreover,
• We say a graph (V,E) is trivial if E = ∅ and V is a singleton.
• We say a graph (V,E) is finite if E is finite.
• We say the graph is undirected when, for each v, v′ ∈ V , (v, v′) ∈ E if and only if
(v′, v) ∈ E.
• We say (V,E) is a bipartite graph if there exists two disjoint sets, V1, V2 ⊂ V , such
that V = V1 ∪ V2 and (v, v′) ∈ E only if v ∈ Vi ⇒ v′ ∈ Vj, for i 6= j. We write these
graphs explicitly as (V1, V2, E).
• We say a bipartite graph (V1, V2, E) is fully connected if for each v1 ∈ V1, (v1, v2) ∈ E
for each v2 ∈ V2.
Definition (networks and prices). Let (J , I, E) be an undirected bipartite graph, and
M ⊂ E be any subset of edges. Let µ : J → R , b : I → R, and pM : M → R be functions
such that pM((j, i)) = pM((i, j)) for each (j, i) ∈ M . We say N = (J , I, E;µ, b) is a buyer-
seller network. We say the function pM is a price function . We say pM is individually
rational (IR) if for each (j, i) ∈M , pM(j, i) ∈ [b(i), µ(j)].
Definition (matching). Let (J , I, E;µ, b) be a network. A set M ⊂ E is a matching if it
satisfies:
• if (j, i), (j, i′) ∈M , then i = i′,
• if (j, i), (j′, i) ∈M , then j = j′,
• (j, i) ∈M if and only if (i, j) ∈M .
Definition (block). Let M be a matching and pM : M → R. We say an edge (i, j) ∈ E \M
blocks (M, pM) if v(i) < v(j).
Definition (pairwise stability). Given a non-trivial network (J , I, E;µ, b) and a matching
M ⊂ E, we say M is pairwise stable at prices pM if the following hold:
• No blocking: no edge (i, j) ∈ E \M blocks (M, pM).
• Individual rationality: pM(i, j) ∈ [b(i), µ(j)] for all (i, j) ∈M .
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Definition (graph abstraction). Let (J , I, E) be a buyer-seller graph. We say a directed
graph (G, E∗) is an abstraction of (J , I, E) in fully connected graphs if the following hold:
• Each G ∈ G is a fully connected graph (JG, IG, EG) such that JG ⊂ J , IG ⊂ I,
EG = {e : e ∈ E and e ∈ (JG × IG) ∪ (IG × JG)},
• {JG : G ∈ G} and {IG : G ∈ G} are a partition of J and I respectively,
• (G,G′) ∈ E∗ if and only if there exists j ∈ JG, i ∈ IG′ such that (j, i) ∈ E.
Moreover, given any matching M ⊂ E, we say (G, E∗) is maximal for M if for each j ∈ J
such that i∗(j) = ∅, the subgraph that contains j is trivial.
Remark 5. Generally, nodes in graphs are the smallest object in the graph. As such, a
more standard definition of abstraction would let the vertices G ∈ G be arbitrary objects in
an arbitrary set, and would include a bijective mapping between G and the relevant subgraphs
of (J , I, E). However, this would imply adding notation that makes the model unnecessarily
cumbersome.
Remark 6. Since one-to-one graphs and trivial graphs are fully connected, an abstraction in
fully connected graphs always exists.
Remark 7. Given a graph (J , I, E), abstractions in fully connected graphs will not neces-
sarily be unique.
Definition (network abstraction). Let (J , I, E;µ, b) be a buyer-seller network. We say
(G, E∗; p) is an abstraction of (J , I, E;µ, b) if the following hold:
• (G, E∗) is an abstraction of (J , I, E),
• If G ∈ G satisfies JG = {j}, IG = ∅, then p(G) = µ(j); if G ∈ G satisfies JG = ∅,
IG = {i}, then p(G) = b(i); otherwise, p(G) ∈ [min{b(i) : i ∈ IG},max{µ(j) : j ∈
JG}].
Definition (stability abstraction). Let (J , I, E;µ, b) be a buyer-seller network and (G, E∗; p∗)
be an abstraction of it in fully connected graphs. We say that M is stable with respect to the
abstraction if three conditions hold:
• G does not break M : for each e ∈M , e ∈ EG for some G ∈ G.
• Prices p(·) induce pairwise stability:
– For each non-trivial G ∈ G, M restricted to G is stable at prices p(j, i) = p∗(G)
for all (j, i) ∈M ∩ EG,
– If G = ({i}, ∅, ∅) for some j, then p∗(G) = b(i),
– If G = (∅, {j}, ∅) for some j, then p∗(G) = µ(j).
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• Cheapest sorting: if (G,G′) ∈ E∗ then p(G) ≤ p(G′).
Remark 8. The cheapest sorting condition is defined to be consistent with the construction
of the edges in E∗. Indeed, we define E∗ so that (G,G′) ∈ E∗ whenever a buyer in G is linked
to a seller in G′. Since buyers search for the cheapest price, then we define cheapest sorting
as p(G) ≤ p(G′). If we took the opposite convention for the edges in E∗, that (G,G′) ∈ E
whenever a seller in G is linked to a buyer in G′, since sellers search for the highest price,
then cheapest sorting would be defined as p(G) ≥ p(G′).
B Proof of Propositions 1, 2, and 4
In this section we prove Propositions 1 and 2. To do this, we define formally what
the induced prices are. Let Let N = (J , I, E;µ, b) be a network, M be a matching, and
A = (G, E∗) be an abstraction of (J , I, E) in fully connected subgraphs. Given a price
function pM such that M is stable with respect to pM , the prices p∗ induced on A are those
that satisfy the following:
• If G ∈ G contains only seller j, then p(G) = µ(j),
• If G ∈ G contains only buyer i, then p(G) = b(i),
• If G ∈ G contains a matched pair (i, j) ∈M , then p(G) = pM(i, j).
• Else, p(G) = max{b(i) : i ∈ IG}.
Similarly, given a function p∗ : G → R we say the prices induced on A by p∗ is the price
function pM defined as follows:
• If (i, j) ∈ EG then pM(i, j) = p(∗G)
Lastly, for simplicity we normalize all outside options to 0. If this were not the case we
need to redefine maximal abstractions so that unmatched sellers are also isolated in trivial
subgraphs. Finally, to rule out trivial cases, assume that µ(j) ≥ 0 for all buyers j.
Proposition 1: Let N = (J , I, E;µ, b) be a network. Let M be a matching. Then the
following are equivalent:
1. There exists pM such that M is stable with respect to pM ,
2. There exists an abstraction in fully connected graphs A = (G, E∗; p∗) such that M is
stable with respect to A.
Proof. 1 implies 2: Let A = (G, E∗; p∗) be defined as follows: For each (i, j) ∈ M let
Gij = ({i}, {j}, {(i, j), (j, i)}). For each i ∈ I such that i∗(j) = ∅ let Gi∅ = ({i}, ∅, ∅) and for
each j ∈ J such that j∗(i) = ∅, let Gj∅ = (∅, {j}, ∅). Let p(Gij) = pM(i, j), p(Gi∅) = b(i) and
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p(Gj∅) = µ(j). Define E∗ so that (G,G′) ∈ E∗ if and only, in the original graph, the buyer in
G is linked with the seller in G′. These ingredients define an abstraction in fully connected
graphs. Moreover, this abstraction is maximal for M and does not break M . Proposition 2
proves that M is stable with respect to (G, E∗; p∗) where p∗ are the prices induced by pM .
2 implies 1: Let A be as in item 2. Then, M is stable with respect to pM where pM
are the prices induced by p∗.
Proposition 2: Let N = (J , I, E;µ, b) be a network, M be a matching, and A =
(G, E∗) be an abstraction of (J , I, E) that does not break M . Assume that A is a maximal
abstraction for M .
• If M is stable with respect to pM , then M is stable with respect to (G, E∗; p∗) where
p∗ are the prices induced on A by pM .
• If M is stable with respect to (G, E∗; p∗) for some p∗, then M is stable with respect to
pM , where pM are the prices induced on N by p∗.
Proof. Part 1: First, notice that because M is stable with respect to pM then p∗ is well
defined. We now check M is stable with respect to (G, E∗; p∗). By construction A does
not break M . Also, because M is stable with respect to pM then prices p∗ induce pairwise
stability in each G ∈ G. We only need to check that cheapest sorting is satisfied. Let G,G′
be such that (G,G′) ∈ E∗, j ∈ JG, i ∈ IG′ such that (i, j) ∈ E. Notice that v(i) ≤ p∗(G′).
Indeed, if i is unmatched then v(i) = b(i) ≤ p∗(G′), and if i is matched then p∗(G′) = v(i).
If G is trivial (i.e. JG = {j}) then p∗(G) = µ(j). Because M is stable with respect to pM
and (i, j) ∈ M , then µ(j) ≤ v(i). Therefore, p∗(G) ≤ p∗(G′). Now assume G is not trivial
(i.e. JG 6= {j}). Then j is matched, so p∗(G) = pM(j, i∗(j)). By stability of M with respect
to pM , pM(j, i∗(j)) = v(j) ≤ v(i). Thus, p∗(G) ≤ p∗(G′).
Part 2: Let (i, j) ∈M . There are four cases:
case 1: no unmatched buyer j′ blocks: Let j′ be such that (j′, i) ∈ E and i∗(j′) = ∅. By
cheapest sorting, p∗(G′) ≤ p∗(G) where G′ is the subgraph that contains j′ and G is the
subgraph that contains i. Since µ(j′) = p∗(G′) then µ(j′) ≤ pM(i, j) so j′ does not block.
case 2: no matched buyer j′ blocks: Let j′ be such that (j′, i) ∈ E and i∗(j′) = i′. By cheapest
sorting, p∗(G′) ≤ p∗(G) where G′ is the subgraph that contains j′ and G is the subgraph that
contains i. Since pM(i′, j′) = p∗(G′) then pM(i′, j′) ≤ pM(i, j) so j′ does not block.
case 3: no unmatched seller i′ blocks: Let i′ be such that (i′, j) ∈ E and j∗(i′) = ∅′. By
cheapest sorting, p∗(G) ≤ p∗(G′) where G′ is the subgraph that contains i′ and G is the
subgraph that contains j. Since G′ contains an unmatched seller then p∗(G′) = 0. Since
0 = p∗(G′) then pM(i, j) = p∗(G) ≤ 0 so 0 = pM(i, j). Thus, i′ does not block.
case 4: no matched seller i′ blocks: Let i′ be such that (i′, j) ∈ E and j∗(i′) = j′′. By cheapest
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sorting, p∗(G) ≤ p∗(G′) where G′ is the subgraph that contains i′ and G is the subgraph that
contains j. Since pM(i′, j′) = p∗(G′) and pM(i, j) = p∗(G) then pM(i′, j′) ≥ pM(i, j). Thus, i′
does not block. Since no blocks are made, M is stable with respect to pM .
Proposition 4. Let J and I be sets of sellers and buyers respectively. Let M ⊂ (J × I)2
be a matching and let N = (J , I, E;µ, b) and N ′ = (J , I, E ′;µ, b) be two networks such that
M ⊂ E and M ⊂ E ′. Assume there exists a graph A = (G, E∗) such that A is an abstraction
of both N and N ′, and that M is stable with respect to (G, E∗; p∗) for some p∗. Then M is
stable in N with respecto to pM , and M is stable in N ′ with respect to p′M , where these are
the prices induced by p∗ in N and N ′ respectively.
The proof of this proposition is a straightforward application of proposition 1. If we add the
assumption that A is maximal forM , then A completely characterizes the prices that sustain
M and the networks that sustain M at those prices. If A is not maximal for M then A only
characterizes a subset of the prices that sustainM , as well as the set of networks that sustain
M at those prices.
An additional application of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 allows us to rationalize pairwise stable matchings as if these where the result
of equilibrium bidding strategies in simultaneous auction games. In the example above,
we can interpret each node in the abstraction as the following second-price auction. Each
seller holds an auction. Buyers can only bid in the sellers’ auction that belongs to same
node in the abstraction. In the example, buyer A only bids in seller 1’s auction, buyers B
and C only bids in seller 3’s auction and seller 2’s auction, buyer D does not bid in any
auction. Finally, we assign fictitious values to the buyer with the second highest valuation in
each node of the abstraction. This fictitious value is determined by the constraints imposed
by the edges in the abstraction. In the example, C has fictitious value µˆ(C) = p(C, 3) ∈
[µ(D), µ(C)], B has ficticious value µˆ(B) ∈ [p(C, 3), µ(B)], A has fictitious value µˆ(A) =
p(A, 1) ∈ [p(C, 3), µ(A)], and D has fictitious value µˆ(D) = µ(D). Following Peters and
Severinov (2006), an equilibrium of these two independent second price auctions is that B
and C purchase goods at a price p = p(C, 3), and buyer A purchases a good at a price between
p(C, 3) and µ(A). By virtue of out previous arguments, these prices make the matching M
stable with respect to the abstraction and thus stable in the original network. Alternatively,
instead of assigning fictitious values to the buyers with the second highest valuation, we can
assign reservation prices to the sellers. Again, these reservation prices are determined by
the constraints imposed by the edges in the abstraction. The outcome of the independent
second-price auctions with fictitious valuations for the buyers is observationally equivalent to
the independent second-price auctions with reservation prices for the sellers. Moreover, the
outcome of either of these independent second-price auctions is indistinguishable from the
outcome of any other mechanism that generates the same matching at the supporting prices.
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C Formal algorithm and proof of Proposition 3
In this appendix we discuss the formal algorithm used in the main paper and prove
some of its properties. We now present the basic notation we use in the match determination
program. Let st ∈ RJ×I be a matrix of prices for each buyer-seller pair. Each element, sti,j,
represents the price that buyer j would have to bid for seller i if j were to bid for i in round
t. Vector qt represents the bidding queue in period t: qtn = j ∈ J represents that in round
t, buyer j is the n-th bidder in the queue. The algorithm ends when l(q) = 0, where l(q)
indicates the length of q. Quantity D(j) indicates j’s demand. Quantities with primes will
indicate quantities that will carry over to the next round of the algorithm. Finally, for each
seller j, we use the following payoff function to model that a buyer can only buy a good from
a seller if the two are linked in the network: uj : I × RI×J :→ R¯, uj(i, s) = µ(j) − si,j if
(i, j) ∈ E and uj(i, s) = −∞ otherwise.
Recall some notational conventions: given a matching M , i∗(·) : J → I ∪ {∅} satisfies
(i∗(j), j) ∈ M for each M -matched j, and i∗(j) = ∅ if j is M -unmatched. Analogously,
j∗(·) : I → J ∪ {∅} satisfies (i, j∗(i)) ∈ M for each M -matched i, and j∗(i) = ∅ if i is M -
unmatched. Also, even if not explicitly stated, the network is denoted N = (I,J , E; b, µ(·)),
I = #I, J = #J .
Match Determination Program.
Input= (N , s0, (u1, ..., uJ), h0, q) where:
• s0 = (s01, ..., s0J) ∈ RJ×I , s0j = (b, ..., b) ∈ RI ,
• For each buyer j, and each t ∈ N ∪ {0}, uj(i, st) = µ(j) − sti,j if (i, j) ∈ E and
uj(i, s
t) = −∞ if (i, j) /∈ E,
• h0 = (0, ..., 0) ∈ RI×J .
• q0 ∈ J J such that q0n = q0m iff m = n.
Start step R(1):
R(t). Set ht = h, st = s, qt = q, j = q1.
1. If max{uj(i, s) : i ∈ I} < 0 set s′ = s and h′ = h, q′ = (q2, ..., ql(q)).
a. If l(q′) = 0, stop, set M = {(i, j) : hi,j = 1}, and Output= M .
b. If l(q′) 6= 0, set qt+1 = q′, st+1 = s′, ht+1 = h′ and proceed to R(t+ 1).
2. If max{uj(i, s) : i ∈ I} ≥ 0 let D(j) ∈ arg max{uj(i, s) : i ∈ I}.
a. If arg max{uj(i, s) : i ∈ I} has more than one element, selectD(j) ∈ arg maxi∈I{uj(i, s)}
randomly.
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3. Set the following parameters:
a. s′D(j),j = sD(j),j; for all j
′ 6= j, s′D(j),j′ = sD(j),j + ∆2 ; s′i′′,j′′ = si′′,j′′ elsewhere,
b. If hD(j),j′ = 0 for all j′ 6= j, set q′ = (q2, ..., ql(q)); if hD(j),j′ = 1 for some j′ 6= j, set
q′ = (q2, ..., ql(q), j′),
c. h′D(j),j = 1; for all j
′ 6= j, h′D(j),j′ = 0; h′i′′,j′′ = hi′′,j′′ elsewhere.
4. If l(q′) = 0, stop. Set M = {(i, j) : hi,j = 1}. Output= M .
If l(q) 6= 0 set h′ = ht+1 and s′ = st+1 and q′ = qt+1. Then start R(t+ 1).
Although this algorithm is motivated by Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford
(1982), there are three important differences. The first is that firm productivities increase in
increments of ∆ whereas bids increase in increments of ∆
2
. Since Crawford and Knoer (1981)
and Kelso and Crawford (1982) work with a discrete core, the algorithm they run produces
a stable match when both bid increments and productivities increase by the same amount.
However, since we work with a continuous core, it is not true that the matching generated by
such an algorithm is stable. One can construct examples where the matching generated by the
algorithms in Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford (1982) (say, M) satisfies
that there is no price function pM such that M is stable with respect to pM . We provide one
example in section B (Figure A6) in the online appendix. The modification we introduce, that
bids live in a finer grid than firm productivities, helps us bypass this problem. The second
difference with the algorithms in Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford (1982)
is that we only use their program to find the matching, but not the prices that make it stable.
The reason is that their algorithm makes prices rise too quickly. While in some networks the
price generated by the algorithms in Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford
(1982) is the pointwise minimum price that makes the matching stable, this is not always
guaranteed. This is because in our setting we violate the non-indifference assumptions made
in Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford (1982). In order to capture, for each
matching, the pointwise maximum and minimum prices at which that matching is stable
we run two independent programs. We call these the Price Determination Programs, and
we describe them below. The first Price Determination Program (I), outputs the pointwise
minimum price function at which a matching is stable. The second Price Determination
program (II), outputs the pointwise maximum price function at which a matching is stable.
The third difference is that, when a seller i accepts a bid from a buyer j, then any future
bid buyer j′ submits to i must outbid j’s bid. In symbols, if in round t seller i accepts bid
sti,j from j, then at the end of round t all sellers j′ linked to i have their bid price raised to
st+1i,j′ = s
t
i,j +
∆
2
. This modification reduces the run time of the algorithm by a factor of four.
Price Determination Program (I).
Input= (N ,M).
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1. For each i ∈ I such that j∗(i) = ∅ set ρ1i = b.
2. For each i ∈ I such that j∗(i) 6= ∅ set ρ1i = max{µ(j) : (i, j) ∈ E and i∗(j) = ∅}.
3. Set t = 1. Start step 4(1).
4(t). Given (ρt1, ..., ρtI):
a. For each i ∈ I such that j∗(i) = ∅ set ρt+1i = ρti.
b. For each i ∈ I such that j∗(i) 6= ∅, let j ≡ j∗(i). Then, set
ρt+1i = max{ρti′ : (∃j′)(i′, j′) ∈M , (i, j′) ∈ E}.
c. If for all i ∈ I ρt+1i = ρti:
∗ For each i such that j∗(i) 6= ∅ set pM(i, j∗(i)) = ρt+1i .
∗ Output= (pM(·)).
d. Otherwise, start step 4(t+ 1).
Price Determination program (I) outputs the minimum price at which M can be made
stable.
Price Determination Program (II).
Input= (N ,M).
1. For each i ∈ I such that j∗(i) = ∅ set ρ1i = b.
2. For each i ∈ I such that j∗(i) 6= ∅ set ρ1i = µ(j∗(i)).
3. Set t = 1. Start step 4(1).
4(t). Given (ρt1, ..., ρtI):
a. For each i ∈ I such that j∗(i) = ∅ set ρt+1i = ρti.
b. For each i ∈ I such that j∗(i) 6= ∅, let j ≡ j∗(i). Then, set
ρt+1i = min{ρti′ : (i′, j) ∈ E}.
c. If for all i ∈ I ρt+1i = ρti:
∗ For each i such that j∗(i) 6= ∅ set pM(i, j∗(i)) = ρt+1i .
∗ Output= (pM(·)).
d. Otherwise, start step 4(t+ 1).
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Price Determination program (II) outputs the maximum price at whichM can be made
stable.
In Section 5 we claimed our algorithm has four properties: it ends in finite time, it
selects a pairwise stable allocation, and for each allocation it selects the pointwise minimum
and maximum prices that sustain it.
Proposition 3: The deferred acceptance algorithm has the following properties:
1. It stops after a finite number of rounds.
2. It outputs a pairwise stable allocation.
3. Price Determination program (I) outputs the pointwise minimum price function at
which M is stable.
4. Price Determination program (II) outputs the pointwise maximum price function at
which M is stable.
We now prove these items one at a time. In what follows, we use MDP and PDP
to abbreviate the Matching Determination Program and the Price Determination Program
respectively. Finally, if (xi)i∈I is a vector indexed by I we use the convenient shorthand
notation x· to denote the whole vector, whenever ambiguity is unlikely.
We need two lemmas: the first, shows that, given M produced by the MDP, there
exist prices pM such that M is stable with respect to M . The second shows that the prices
generated by the PDP are weakly lower than any pM such that M is stable with respect to
M . To prove these Lemmas, recall that (ρti)i∈I,t≥1 from the PDP(I) is defined as follows:
• If j∗(i) = ∅, ρti = b for all t.
• If j∗(i) = j for some j ∈ J , ρ1i = max{µ(j) : (i, j) ∈ E, i∗(j) = ∅} for each i ∈ I, and
ρti = max{ρt−1i′ : (∃j′, i′) : (j′, i′) ∈M , (j′, i) ∈ E} for all t ≥ 2.
The following properties imply that there exists a value T such that, for all i and all t ≥ T ,
ρti = ρ
t+1
i . That is, (ρt·)t≥0 is eventually constant. We let ρ∞· ≡ limt→∞ ρt· .
1. For all i, ρti ≤ ρt+1i . This follows because ρt−1i ∈ {ρt−1i′ : (∃j′) : (j′, i′) ∈ M , (j′, i) ∈ E}
whenever j∗(i) = j and ρti = b whenever j∗(i) = ∅.
2. For all i, ρti ≤ max{µ(j) : j ∈ J }.
3. For all i, if ρti 6= ρt+1i then ρt+1i − ρti ≥ ∆.
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Finally, recall that ∆ ∈ R is chosen so that for all j ∈ J , µ(j) = b+kj∆ for for kj ∈ N∪{0}.
In particular, µ(j) ≥ b for all j. This normalization only rules out uninteresting cases where
a buyer never places a bid and is never matched to a seller.
Lemma 1. Let M be the matching produced by the MDP. Then, there exists pM such that
M is stable with respect to pM .
Proof. For each edge (i, j) ∈ M define pM(i, j) = ρ∞i where (ρti)i∈J ,t∈N∪{∞} is as defined in
the PDP(I). Also, let T be the last round of the MDP and let [sTi,j]i∈I,j∈J be the matrix of
final prices generated by the MDP. We show that M is stable with respect to pM . Assume
first that (i, j) ∈ E are such that j∗(i) = i∗(j) = ∅. Then i received no bids, so sTi,j = b.
Since the algorithm ended, it must be that uj(i, sT ) < 0⇔ µ(j) < b, a contradiction. Thus,
there does not exist an edge (i, j) ∈ E such that j∗(i) = i∗(j) = ∅ so, a fortiori, no such
edge (i, j) ∈ E blocks M . Now let (i, j) ∈ M . Pick j′ 6= j such that (i, j′) ∈ E. We show
(i, j′) ∈ E does not block M . If i∗(j′) = ∅ then µ(j′) ≤ ρ1i ≤ ρ∞i = pM(i, j). If i∗(j′) 6= ∅
then ρ∞i ≥ ρ∞i∗(j′) by construction. Thus, pM(i, j) ≥ pM(i∗(j′), j′). Thus, (i, j′) does not block
M . Pick i′ 6= i such that (i′, j) ∈ E. We show (i′, j) ∈ E does not block M . If j∗(i′) 6= ∅
then ρ∞i′ ≥ ρ∞i by construction. Thus, pM(i′, j∗(i′)) ≥ pM(i, j). Let j∗(i′) = ∅. Then i′ never
received a bid. Let t be the last time j bids for i. Since bidders bid for the cheapest seller
sti,j ≤ sti′,j = b. By definition of t, sti,j = sTi,j so sTi,j = pM(i, j) = b. We use this to argue that
ρ1
iˆ
= b for all matched iˆ such that (i, j∗(ˆi)) ∈ E (note that i is one such iˆ). Pick iˆ such that
j∗(ˆi) 6= ∅ and (i, j∗(ˆi)) ∈ E. Then, sT
iˆ,j∗ (ˆi) ≤ sTi,j∗ (ˆi). 37 Since sTi,j = b and sTi,j∗ (ˆi) ≤ sTi,j + ∆2 ,
then sT
iˆ,j∗ (ˆi) ≤ b+ ∆2 . If there exists j˜ such that i∗(j˜) = ∅ and (ˆi, j˜) ∈ E, then it must be that
µ(j˜) = b. Indeed, if µ(j˜) > b then µ(j˜) ≥ b+∆ which is a contradiction: since sT
iˆ,j∗ (ˆi) ≤ b+ ∆2
and i∗(j˜) = ∅, uj˜ (ˆi, sT ) ≥ 0, which contradicts T being the last round of the MDP. Thus,
µ(j˜) = b. Hence, ρ1
iˆ
= b. We now conclude the argument in an inductive manner: if ρk
iˆ
= b
for some k and all iˆ that satisfy j∗(ˆi) 6= ∅ and (i, j∗(ˆi)) ∈ E, then by construction ρk+1i = b.
Thus, ρ∞i = b = pM(i, j). Thus, (i′, j) does not block M . Therefore, M is stable with respect
to pM .
Lemma 2. Let M be the matching generated by the MDP. Let pM be any price function such
that M is stable with respect to pM (which is well defined by our previous lemma) and let v
be the associated payment function. Let p∗M be the price generated by the PDP(I) and v∗ the
corresponding payment function. Then, v∗ ≤ v.
Proof. Let M , pM , v, p∗M and v∗ be as in the statement of the lemma. Then, for all i,
v(i) ≥ ρ1i . Indeed, if j∗(i) = ∅ then v(i) = b = ρ1i . If j∗(i) = j for some j then, by stability
of M with respect to pM , v(i) ≥ µ(j′) for each j′ such that i∗(j′) = ∅. Thus, v(i) ≥ ρ1i .
37 Indeed, let t be the last time j∗(ˆi) bids for iˆ. Then, st
iˆ,j∗ (ˆi)
= sT
iˆ,j∗ (ˆi)
, and st
iˆ,j∗ (ˆi)
≤ st
i,j∗ (ˆi)
, where the
last inequality holds because buyers always bid for the cheapest sellers. By monotonicity of the matrix of
prices, st
i,j∗ (ˆi)
≤ sT
i,j∗ (ˆi)
. Thus, sT
iˆ,j∗ (ˆi)
≤ sT
i,j∗ (ˆi)
.
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We now show that if v ≥ ρt for some k, then v ≥ ρt+1. Indeed, for all i such that j∗(i) = ∅,
v(i) = b = ρti = ρ
t+1
i . For all i such that j∗(i) = j, we have the following:
ρt+1i = max{ρti′ : (∃j′, i′)(i′, j′) ∈M and (i, j′) ∈ E}
≤ max{v(i′) : (∃j′, i′)(i′, j′) ∈M and (i, j′) ∈ E} ≤ v(i),
where the last inequality follows from stability of M with respect to pM . Thus, for each t
and each i, ρti ≤ v(i). Hence ρ∞· ≡ v∗(·) ≤ v(·).
We now prove items 1 through 4 of Proposition 1.
1. The algorithm ends in finite time.
Proof. By the same arguments as Crawford-Knoer, the matching determination program
ends in finite time. Furthermore, let K ∈ N satisfy max{µ(j) : j ∈ J } = b+K∆. Then the
price determination program ends in at most 2K rounds.
2. The algorithm outputs a pairwise stable matching.
Lemma 1 already shows thatM is stable with respect to pM when pM is the price function
generated by PDP(I). Lemma 3 below shows that M is also stable with respect to pM when
pM is the price function generated by PDP(II).
3. Price Determination program (I) outputs the pointwise minimum price
function at which M is stable.
Proof. Follows from lemma 2 and that M is stable with respect to pM , where pM is the price
function generated by the PDP (I).
4. Price Determination program (II) outputs the pointwise maximum price
function at which M is stable.
The proof is analogous to the proof that the PDP(I) outputs the pointwise minimum price
function at which M is stable. Reasoning as in Lemma 2, if pM is such that M is stable at
prices pM , and v is the corresponding payment function, then v(·) ≤ ρ∞· (Lemma 4 below).
Moreover, M is stable at prices induced by ρ∞· (Lemma 3, below). The result then follows
from Lemmas 3 and 4.
Lemma 3. Let M be the matching generated by the MDP, and let pM be the prices generated
by the PDP(II). M is stable with respect to pM .
Proof. Let M be the matching outputted by the matching determination program, and pM
be the prices generated by the price determination program. Assume (i, j) ∈ E, j∗(i) =
i∗(j) = ∅. Since there exists pˆM such that M is stable with respect to pˆM then µ(j) ≤ b.
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Thus (i, j) do not block M at ρ∞. Now consider (i, j) ∈M . We show no seller and no buyer
wishes to block (i, j):
a. No Buyer blocks: Let j′ be such that (i, j′) ∈ E. If i∗(j′) 6= ∅ then, by construction,
ρ∞i∗(j′) ≤ ρ∞i , so (i, j′) does not block. Assume now that i∗(j′) = ∅. We say a seller i′
is indirectly connected to seller j if there exists sequences (i1, ..., ik) and (j1, ..., jk−1)
such that (i1, j) ∈ E, (i1, j1) ∈ E, (i2, j1) ∈ E, ..., (ik, jk−1) ∈ E, with i′ = ik.
That is, if a path can be constructed from j to i′. By construction, min{µ(j∗(i′)) :
i′ is indirectly connected to j} ≤ ρ∞i where, by convention, µ(∅) = b. Now consider the
abstraction used in Proposition 1 item [1]: each matched pair (ˆi, jˆ) ∈ M is assigned
their own subgraph, and all unmatched buyers/sellers are assigned a trivial subgraph
that contains only them. Because there exist prices pˆM such that M is stable at pˆM ,
cheapest sorting implies that
µ(j′) ≤ pˆM(i, j) ≤ min{v(i′) : i′ is indirectly connected to j}
≤ min{µ(j∗(i′)) : i′ is indirectly connected to j}.
Thus, µ(j′) ≤ ρ∞i so (i, j′) does not block.
b No Seller blocks: Let i′ be such that (i′, j) ∈ E. By construction, ρ∞i ≤ ρ∞i′ . Thus,
(i′, j) does not block.
Lemma 4. Let M be the matching generated by the MDP. Let pM be any price function such
that M is stable with respect to pM (which is well defined by our previous lemma) and let v
be the associated payment function. Let p∗M be the price generated by the PDP(II) and v∗ the
corresponding payment function. Then, v∗ ≥ v.
Proof. Let M , pM , v, p∗M and v∗ be as in the statement of the lemma. Then, v(i) ≤ ρ1i for
all i. Indeed, if j∗(i) = ∅ then v(i) = b = ρ1i . If j∗(i) = j for some j then, by stability of M
with respect to pM , v(i) ≤ µ(j) = ρ1i .
We now show that if v ≤ ρt for some k, then v ≤ ρt+1. Indeed, for all i such that j∗(i) = ∅,
v(i) = b = ρti = ρ
t+1
i . For all i such that j∗(i) = j, we have the following:
ρt+1i = min{ρti′ : (i′, j) ∈ E}
≥ min{v(i′) : (i′, j) ∈ E} ≥ v(i),
where the last inequality follows from stability of M with respect to pM . Thus, for each t
and eaxh i, ρti ≥ v(i). Hence ρ∞· ≡ v∗(·) ≥ v(·).
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